한국정치/북한_DPRK2018. 5. 13. 13:01

문재인 대통령과 김정은 국무위원장은 풍계리 핵시험장 폐기를 취재할 국제기자단에 일본 언론인들도 초청하는 것을 재검토해야 한다. 그 이유는 일본에는 45만 한국계 (민단) 재일동포와 3~4만 북한(총련)계 재일동포가 살고 있기 때문에, 냉전체제 해체와 동북아 평화체제 형성과정에서, 일본을 배제하지 말고 이 과정에 참여시켜야 한다. 


일본에 거주하고 있는 남북한 재일동포 50만이 일본 시민권과 영주권을 자유로이 획득하고 일본인들과 동등한 정치 권리를 갖게 만들어야 한다. 북일수교도 역시 북미수교만큼 중요한 현안으로 곧 떠오를 것이기 때문에, 지금부터 일본과 두 코리아 사이의 모든 정치적 문화적 역사적 갈등들을 해결할 준비를 해야 한다.

  


자료 1. 북한 출처: DPRK 외무성:


조선로동당 중앙위원회 제7기 제3차전원회의 결정에 따라 핵무기연구소를 비롯한 해당 기관들에서는 핵시험중지를 투명성있게 담보하기 위하여 공화국 북부핵시험장을 폐기하기 위한 실무적대책을 세우고있다.


핵시험장을 페기하는 의식은 5월 23일부터 25일사이에 일기조건을 고려하면서 진행하는것으로 예정되여있다.

핵시험장페기는 핵시험장의 모든 갱도들을 폭발의 방법으로 붕락시키고 입구들을 완전히 페쇄한 다음 지상에 있는 모든 관측설비들과 연구소들,경비구분대들의 구조물들을 철거하는 순차적인 방식으로 진행된다.


핵시험장페기와 동시에 경비인원들과 연구사들을 철수시키며 핵시험장주변을 완전페쇄하게 된다.

이와 관련하여 조선민주주의인민공화국 외무성은 위임에 따라 다음과 같은 결정사항들을 공보한다.


첫째,당중앙위원회 제7기 제3차전원회의 결정에 따라 진행되는 북부핵시험장페기를 투명성있게 보여주기 위하여 국내언론기관들은 물론 국제기자단의 현지취재활동을 허용할 용의가 있다.

핵시험장이 협소한 점을 고려하여 국제기자단을 중국,로씨야,미국,영국,남조선에서 오는 기자들로 한정시킨다.


둘째,국제기자단 성원들의 방문 및 취재활동과 관련하여 다음과 같은 실무적조치들을 취하게 된다.


1)모든 국제기자단 성원들이 베이징-원산항로를 리용할수 있도록 전용기를 보장하며 령공개방 등 필요한 조치들을 취하게 된다.

2)국제기자단 성원들을 위하여 원산에 특별히 준비된 숙소를 보장하며 기자쎈터를 설치하여 리용하도록 한다.

3)원산으로부터 북부핵시험장까지 국제기자단 성원들을 위한 특별전용렬차를 편성한다.

4)핵시험장이 인적이 드문 깊은 산골짜기에 위치한 점을 고려하여 국제기자단 성원들이 특별전용렬차에서 숙식하도록 하며 해당한 편의를 제공한다.

5)국제기자단 성원들이 핵시험장폐기 상황을 현지에서 취재촬영한 다음 기자쎈터에서 통신할수 있도록 필요한 조건을 보장하고 협조한다.


조선민주주의인민공화국은 앞으로도 조선반도와 세계의 평화와 안정을 수호하기 위하여 주변국들과 국제사회와의 긴밀한 련계와 대화를 적극화해나갈것이다.


주체107(2018)년 5월 12일

평 양(끝)


참고자료 2. http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44094740




North Korea says it will begin dismantling its nuclear test site in less than two weeks in a ceremony attended by foreign journalists.

Pyongyang said it was taking "technical measures" to carry out the process between 23-25 May, North Korean state news agency KCNA reported on Saturday.


Scientists previously said the site may have partially collapsed in September.


The move is due to take place three weeks before US President Donald Trump meets North Korean leader Kim Jong-un.


In April, South Korean officials said Mr Kim had stated he "would carry out the closing of the nuclear test site in May", adding that nuclear experts from South Korea and the US would be invited to watch.


Their comments came after talks between Mr Kim and South Korea's President Moon Jae-in.

However there was no mention of allowing foreign experts access to the site in Saturday's statement from North Korea.

What will the pledged ceremony include?


The dismantling of the Punggye-ri site, the exact date of which will depend on weather conditions, will involve the collapsing of all tunnels using explosives and the removal of all observation facilities, research buildings and security posts.


Journalists from South Korea, China, the US, the UK and Russia will be asked to attend to witness the event.


North Korea said the intention was to allow "not only the local press but also journalists of other countries to conduct on-the-spot coverage in order to show in a transparent manner the dismantlement of the northern nuclear test ground".


The reason officials gave for limiting the number of countries invited to send journalists was due to the "small space of the test ground... located in the uninhabited deep mountain area".


What do we know about the test site?


Situated in mountainous terrain in the north-east, the Punggye-ri site is thought to be the North's main nuclear facility.

Nuclear tests have taken place in a system of tunnels dug below Mount Mantap, near the Punggye-ri site.

Six nuclear tests have been carried out there since 2006.


After the most recent test, which took place in September 2017, a series of aftershocks hit the site, which seismologists believe collapsed part of the mountain's interior.


Will North Korea really denuclearise?


Pyongyang's professed commitment to "denuclearisation" is likely to differ from Washington's demand for "comprehensive, verifiable and irreversible" nuclear disarmament.


On a recent visit to North Korea, US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo stressed that any such claim would require a "robust verification" programme by the US and other nations.

North Korea has also reneged on a number of promises made in previous years.


In 1994, then-US President Bill Clinton made plans to attack sites in North Korea based on intelligence that the state had begun shipping fuel rods that could be used to produce plutonium to its main nuclear facility, the Yongbyon complex.


The threat of US strikes at the time, along with an offer from the Clinton administration to help boost the state's struggling economy, led to an agreement with the North Koreans.


The US provided fuel to an energy-starved economy, and North Korea agreed to freeze its programme. But Pyongyang later breached the agreement and the deal fell apart in 2002.


In 2007, Pyongyang announced that it had shut its Yongbyon reactor as part of a disarmament-for-aid deal. The following year it demolished the facility's cooling tower in a symbol of its commitment to ending its nuclear programme.


Then, in 2013, North Korea said it would restart operations at the Yongbyon site - a move that was later confirmed by experts.

How important is the Trump-Kim meeting?


Mr Trump and Mr Kim are due to meet in Singapore on 12 June. It will be the first time a sitting US president has ever met a North Korean leader.


The key issue expected to be discussed is North Korea's nuclear weapons programme, over which the two leaders furiously sparred in 2017.

The US wants Pyongyang to give up its weapons programme completely and irreversibly.


Confirmation of the meeting between the two men came after landmark talks between North and South Korea.


Mr Trump announced the date and place of the summit earlier this week, hours after he welcomed home three US detainees released from North Korea.


"We will both try to make it a very special moment for World Peace!" he tweeted.

Is North Korea opening up?


There is a "sense of optimism" among North Korea's leaders, the head of the UN's World Food Programme (WFP) said on Saturday after enjoying what he said was unprecedented access to the country.


David Beasley spent two days in the capital, Pyongyang, and two outside it, accompanied by government minders.


He said the country was working hard to meet nutritional standards, and hunger was not as high as in the 1990s.


Mr Beasley's visit, from 8-11 May, included trips to WFP-funded projects - a children's nursery in South Hwanghae province and a fortified biscuit factory in North North Pyongyan province.


"I didn't see starvation like you had in the famine back in the 1990s, that's the good news. But is there a hunger issue, is there under-nutrition? There's no question about it," he told the BBC.


"There is a sense of turning a new page in history," he said.




Posted by NJ원시

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정책비교/국제정치2018. 5. 10. 20:35


May 1 at 7:14pm · 


(견해) #미국판_홍준표_존_볼튼 임명 당시에 언급한대로, 볼튼의 훼방작전은 이번 흐름에서 큰 효과를 발휘하지 못할 것이다. 왜냐하면 외교적 성과를 가장 크게 또 쉽게 낼 수 있는 북핵 문제를 트럼프가 놓쳐 버린다면, 노벨 평화상도 날아갈 뿐더러, 미국내 불안정한 트럼프 입지가 흔들릴 수 있기 때문이다. John Bolton's boss is Trump.


그런데 왜 트럼프는 전쟁광이라고 손가락질 받는 볼튼을 임명했는가 ? 한국언론과 지식계가 간과하고 있는 미국 엘리트 백인 남성 프라터니티(fraternity) 문화도 한몫 했다고 본다. 단순화시키면 트럼프와 볼튼 관계는 조폭보다 더 강한 위계질서로 움직인다. 좋은 의미건 나쁜 의미건 '관계 network:relation' (꽌시)가 중요하다.



존 볼튼은 군산복합체 딕 체니(Dick Cheney)류 대변자이지만, 트럼프 직원이다. 트럼프가 자기와 케미가 맞은 인물이 존 볼튼이라고 봤다. 빅터 차는 트럼프의 예스 노를 구별하지 못한다고 봤고, 존 볼튼은 금새 알아들을 것으로 본 것이다.(차후 진실은 더 밝혀질 것이고)



(* 아래 기사 핵심 요지) 


1.존 볼튼이 북미회담 성공을 방해하는 정보를 와싱턴 정가 씽크탱크에 흘리면서 북한을 여전히 악마화하고 있다. 그 사례로 압록강 주변 핵무기 등급의 흑연 공장을 북한이 가동하고 있다. 이것은 핵무기 기술 해외 수출용이다. 따라서 볼튼 주장은 김정은의 제스처를 믿으면 안된다는 것이다.



2.볼튼이 주장하는 핵무기 철거 방식은 직역하면 '비환영 조사 intrusive inspection'이다.



미국이 북한에 들어가서 군사시설을 포함한 핵실험장, 핵무기를 직접 들고 항구나 공항을 통해 그 핵물질들을 운반해 미국으로 가져 오겠다는 방식이다.

그 사례는 리비아 핵 프로그램을 미국 테네시 주 오우크 리지(Oak Ridge)에 보관하고 있는 것이다.



(*견해: 북한이 이러한 무슨 집수리할 때처럼 시공자가 남의 집에 들어와서 주인 허락도 없이 외벽이나 지붕을 다 뜯어보고 intrusive inspection 해버리는 방식이 국가간에도 허용될리는 만무하다. 북한도 이런 비환영 개봉 조사는 수용하지 않을 것이다.

그런데도 존 볼튼은 리비야 Libya 흘러간 노래를 타령할 것이고, 트럼프도 회담 전까지는 볼튼을 방조할 것이다. 최대 압박 카드 담당자가 볼튼이기 때문이다.)







by

Did John Bolton Leak Intelligence to Sabotage a Trump-Kim Deal?


Bolton isn't just uninterested in selling a denuclearization deal to the public, he’s working actively to undermine it.



The still-unscheduled Donald Trump-Kim Jong Un summit offers the opportunity for a denuclearization deal that would avoid a possible nuclear war, but that potential deal remains vulnerable to a hostile corporate media sector and political elites in the United States. At the center of this hostility is national security adviser John Bolton, who’s not just uninterested in selling a denuclearization deal to the public. He’s working actively to undermine it.



Strong circumstantial evidence indicates that he leaked intelligence to a Washington think tank sympathetic to his views in order to generate media questioning about the president’s announced plan to reach an agreement with North Korea’s leader.

Bolton made no secret of his visceral opposition to such a deal before Trump announced that Bolton would become national security adviser, arguing that Kim Jong Un would never let go of his nuclear weapons, especially since he is so close to having a real nuclear deterrent capability vis-a-vis the United States.


Even after meeting Trump on March 6 to discuss joining the administration, Bolton was not expecting the announcement of a Trump-Kim summit. Trump tweeted about progress in talks with North Korea that day, but when asked about such talks in an interview with Fox News later that same day, Bolton dismissed the whole idea. He portrayed Kim’s willingness to have discussions as aimed at diverting Washington’s attention from Pyongyang nearing its goal of having a “deliverable nuclear weapon.”


After the Trump-Kim summit was announced on March 9, Bolton made a tactical adjustment in his public stance toward talks with Kim to avoid an open conflict with Trump. He started suggesting in interviews that Trump had cleverly “foiled” Kim’s plan for long, drawn-out talks by accepting the proposal for a summit meeting. But he also urged Trump to assume a stance that would guarantee the meeting would fail.


In an interview with Fox News on the day of the summit announcement, Bolton suggested a peremptory demand by Trump to Kim: “Tell us what ports should American ships sail in, what airports American planes can land to load your nuclear weapons.” 


And in a second interview with Fox that day, Bolton suggested that Trump demand that Kim identify the ports and airfields to be used to “dismantle your nuclear program and put it at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where Libya’s nuclear program lives.” Bolton’s invocation of the Libyan example of giving up a nuclear weapons program was an ostentatious way of conveying his intention to keep open the option of using force to overthrow Kim’s regime.


Bolton was staking his opposition to negotiations with Kim primarily on the argument that North Korea would simply exploit such negotiations to complete its testing of a nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). But former CIA Director Mike Pompeo got a concrete commitment from Kim to end all tests during their meetings in Pyongyang on April 7-8, which Kim then announced officially on April 20.


Pompeo’s report on Kim’s commitment, coming just before Bolton’s first day in the White House on April 9, immediately vitiated Bolton’s chief argument against a denuclearization agreement. But Bolton had another argument to fall back on. When a Fox News interviewer asked him on March 6 about a possible nuclear testing freeze, Bolton replied, “A freeze won’t work. The only inspections system that you could have with any prospect of finding out what they’re up to would have to be so intrusive it would threaten the stability of the regime.”


As an argument that a testing halt wouldn’t work, that comment was nonsensical: The United States has no intrusive inspections to detect a test of a long-range North Korean missile or of a nuclear weapon. But Bolton could use the need for an intrusive inspection system that North Korea would resist as an argument against a denuclearization agreement. 


He was well aware that in 2008, Vice President Dick Cheney forced Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to change the agreement she had reached with North Korea in October 2007 to require an intrusive verification system at a different stage of implementation—before the United States had taken North Korea off the terrorism list and ended the application of the Trading with the Enemy Act rather than after that, as had been originally agreed. North Korea refused to accept the new verification demand and then denounced the agreement in late 2008.



Within a few days of Bolton taking over as national security adviser, someone leaked intelligence to a Washington think tank on a North Korean facility allegedly intended to produce nuclear-grade graphite, a key component of nuclear reactors. The leak resulted in a post by David Albright, the executive director of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS), on April 20 with satellite images of what he identified as a North Korean nuclear-grade graphite plant. 


Albright wrote that a “knowledgeable government official” had identified the site of the factory on the Yalu River, which divides North Korea from China.


Albright suggested that the factory “violates the spirit of the upcoming summit processes with the United States and South Korea.” And he concluded that any agreement with North Korea “must contain its verifiable commitments not to proliferate nuclear goods and abide by internationally recognized strategic export control regimes.”


But Albright presented no evidence that the building under U.S. intelligence surveillance had any bearing on negotiations on denuclearization. His report made it clear that analysts had only suspicions rather than hard evidence that it was for nuclear-grade graphite, referring to “the suspect site” and to “the suspect facility.” Albright also admitted that nuclear-grade graphite is a “dual use” material, and that an existing North Korean facility produces it for components of domestic and foreign ballistic missiles, not for nuclear plants.


Albright nevertheless implied that nuclear-grade graphite is produced and traded covertly. In fact, it is sold online by trading companies such as Alibaba like any other industrial item.


On April 21, despite the absence of any real link between the “suspect facility” and a prospective denuclearization agreement, The Washington Post published an article by intelligence reporter Joby Warrick, based on Albright’s post, that suggested such a link. Warrick referred to a “suspected graphite production facility” that could allow North Korea’s “weapons program” to “quietly advance while creating an additional source of badly needed export revenue.”


Adopting Bolton’s key argument against a denuclearization agreement, Warrick wrote, “It is unclear how the United States and its allies would reliably verify a suspension of key facets of North Korea’s nuclear program or confirm that it has stopped selling weapons components to partners overseas.” North Korea has “a long history of concealing illicit weapons activity from foreign eyes,” Warrick argued, adding that, unlike Iran, it “does not allow inspectors to visit its nuclear facilities.”


But Warrick failed to inform readers that North Korea had allowed 24-hour, 7-day-a-week inspections of their nuclear facilities from the time the agreed framework was adopted in 1994 until December 2002, after Bolton had successfully engineered the George W. Bush administration’s open renunciation of that Clinton administration agreement. And in the negotiations in 2007-08, Pyongyang only had objected to the U.S. demand for intrusive inspection—including military sites—before the United States had ended its suite of hostile policies toward North Korea.


The graphite factory episode would not be the first time Bolton had used alleged intelligence to try to block a negotiated agreement. In early 2004, Bolton, as undersecretary of state for arms control and international security, was determined to prevent the British, French and German governments from reaching an accord with Iran that would frustrate Cheney’s plan for an eventual U.S. military option against Iran.


 Bolton gave satellite images of Iran’s Parchin military complex to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) claiming that they were appropriate for certain kinds of nuclear weapons testing, as Seymour Hersh later reported. Bolton demanded that the IAEA inspect the sites, evidently hoping that Iran would refuse such an intrusive inspection and allow the Bush administration to accuse Iran of hiding covert weapons activities.


But the IAEA failed to refer to the satellite images of Parchin in two 2004 reports on Iran. Then the State Department provided them to ABC News, which reported that a State Department official “confirmed the United States suspects nuclear activity at some of [Parchin’s] facilities.” 


But the ABC report also quoted a former senior Department of Defense official who specialized in nuclear weapons as saying the images did not constitute evidence of any nuclear weapons-related activities. Iran let the IAEA inspect 10 Parchin sites in two separate visits in 2005. Taking environment samples in each case, the inspectors found no evidence of nuclear-related activity.


Bolton’s hopes of keeping the option of U.S. war on Iran flopped in 2004, but he still believes in a first strike against North Korea, as he urged in an op-ed in late February. And he can be expected to continue to use his position in the White House to try to keep that option open as he did with Iran in 2004, in part by covert leaks of information to allies outside the government.

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