정책비교/국제정치2015. 7. 26. 23:24
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에티엔 발리바르, 산드로 메자드라, 프리더 오토 볼프 , 7월 20일,2015

뷔르셀 (EC) 강제 조약 (diktat) 그리고 향후 전망


ETIENNE BALIBAR, SANDRO MEZZADRA, and FRIEDER OTTO WOLF 20 July 2015


1. 기본인식: 제 3차 구제금융 협상안은, 강제 집행 불가능하다 (unenforceable):

(두 당사자들이 합의한다면, 이것은 타당하지만, 법원이 그 두 당사자들을 강제로 그 협약을 실행하라고 명령할 수 없다)


- 그리스 위기 3 단계

1) 채무 상황과 긴축정책 결과들

2) 유럽이 부국과 빈국, 경제주권 소유와 박탈 국가로 분리되다.

3) 민주 체제의 붕괴, 그로인한 포률리즘에 기초한 민족주의 발호


그리스인의 시각에서 볼 때, 협상안은 강제 명령 (diktat) 1914년 베르사이유 Versailles 조약, 그 결과, 독일은 하이퍼 인플레이션, 마이마르 공화국 붕괴, 나치즘 등장, 결국 제 2차 세계대전 발발

왜 이런 주장이 타당한가? 2가지 이유다.

첫 번째, 유럽은 그리스의 시각에 볼 때, 고리대금업자와 약탈자였다.

왜 그러한가? 그리스자원의 성장이나 생존가능성을 목표로 하지 않고,

그것들이 다 고갈될 때까지 빼먹는 것을 목표로 설정했다.

- 유럽채권단 트로이카는 통화주의 교조 monetarist orthodoxy (*마스트리히 조약에 근거) 와 2012년 정부 기초 재정 협약 budgetary pact of 2012 고수

- 더 악날한 것은, 트로이카 역시 그리스 현실을 잘 알고 있다는 것이다. (1) 그리스 국가 채무는 지난 10년간 2배로 뛰었다. (2) 경제 재앙 때문에 국가 채무가 GDP의180%에 육박한 게 아니라, 생산과 소비의 붕괴 때문이라는 것도 잘 알고 있다.

=> 결국, 트로이카는 그리스에 대한 정치적 보복을 한 것이고, 그리스인들이 수치심을 느끼도록 만들었다.


두 번째 이유:

양해 각서 Memorandum of Understanding 이 그리스 기존 법률을 폐지할 수 있고 대체할 수 있는 권력을 가진다. 특히 행정부의 탈-정치화 ->주권 탈취하겠다는 의도이고, troika 에 반대하는 급진파들이 그리스 시리자 정부에 장관으로 일하지 못하게끔 원천봉쇄, 제거하겠다는 것이다.

- 트로이카 관료가 다시 아테네로 와서 시리자 정부를 감시한다.


2. 유럽의 신 헌법

어떤 종류의 정치정체 (政體 : regime) 이냐? 유럽에서 그 정체 특성이 뭐냐?

어떠한 거버넌스인가? 살펴보자.


- 현재 유럽 연합의 지배적인 통치 양식은 신자유주의이고, 그 신자유주의적 ‘자유 liberty' 는 본질적으로 강압적, 억압적이다.

- 상층 행정 관료 엘리트들이 유럽연합 정치를 지배하고 독점하고 있다.

“닥치고 수용해라 ! 팻 어컴플리 ‘fait accompli’ ”

- 특징은, 위로부터 아래로 눌러찍은 ‘혁명’

- 누구를 위한 정치인가? 유럽 국가들의 은행들, 금융자본의 이익에 부합하고 있다.

- 독일 사회정치학자 하버마스는 이러한 유럽연합 정치 특징을 가리켜 “ 탈-민주주의적 행정관료-연방주의” 라고 명명했다. 다시 말해서, 유럽연합 민주주의는 심각한 결함이 있다는 것이고, 그 특징적 문제점은 행정 관료들의 명령이 시민들의 의사 결정보다 더 앞선다는 것이다.


- 이러한 행정 관료 엘리트 정치 행태 특징은, 불투명하고 비공식적인 정치 행태로 일관하는 것이다. 따라서 유럽위원회 EC는 더 이상 정치적 이니셔티브를 갖지도 못하고 각 국가들간 이해관계들을 조정해내지도 못하고 있다.


- 대표성 상실; 유로그룹 (재무장관 회의체) : 조약에 의해서 만들어진 그룹도 아니고, 규칙도 없다. 내부에서 그냥 대변인을 뽑고, 독일의 영향력 아래에 있다.


- 물론 독일 제국주의가 실제로 존재한다고 해도, 유럽의 물질적 구성 자체가 독일 제국주의의 가면이라고 말하는 것은 아니다.


독일 헤게모니 특징은 무엇인가?

(1) 직접적이지 않다. 간접적이다. 보조적이다 혹은 매락에 의한 것은 아니다.

(2) 독일 헤게모니는 부분적이다. 권력 블록(리그/연합/동맹: power bloc)에 참여하고 있는 다양한 적대자들로부터 오는 도전에 직면해 있기도 하다.

(3) 유럽중앙은행 내부에도 갈등은 있다. 바이트만 (Weidmann) 과 드라기(Drahi: 유럽중앙은행 총재) 사이에 주기적으로 갈등과 이견이 발생하고 있다. 또한 독일 재무장관 쇼이블레과 유럽중앙은행이 동일하지 않다.


- 드라기는 그렉시트를 원하지 않는다.


반면 쇼이블레는 그리스 유로존 탈퇴를 요구했다. 유로존을 독일 중심으로 만들어나가기 위해서였다. 이러한 통치 거버넌스 내부 차이와 분열 역시 유로존의 물질적 구성이다.

소결: 유럽연합과 유로존에서 독일의 단일한 헤게모니가 작동하지는 않는다


그렇다면 제 3차 구제금융 협상의 특징은 무엇인가?

(1) 그리스 정부에 비현실적이고 달성불가능한 구조 개혁 ‘강제 명령 Diktat'이다.

(2) 향후 전망: - 그리스 뿐만 아니라 유럽 다른 사회 세력들의 반대에 부딪힐 것이다. 이러한 반대와 저항이 어떻게 전개될 것인가? 그것은 현재 그리스 국가 채무위기를 비롯한 유럽 위기에 각 국가들이 어떠한 전략을 쓰느냐에 따라 달라질 것이다.


3. 유럽집행위원회 내부 프랑스와 독일 분열

‘Brussels night’ reveals Franco-German divisions


- 7월 11일~12일 협상 과정에서 드러난 것은, 독일과 프랑스의 불일치와 의견 차이이다.


현재 유럽국가들은 4가지 관점으로 분류될 수 있다.

영국은 유럽연합 탈퇴 Brexit 를 고민하기 때문에 제외하자.

1) 독일과 독일 편을 드는 국가들은 그리스에 ‘긴축’ 강요.

2) 북유럽과 동유럽의 빈국들 - 그리스에게만 채무 변제 혜택이 돌아가길 바라지 않는다.

3) 남부 서부 채무 국가들; 그리스와 달리 이미 긴축을 수용

4) 프랑와 이탈리아 입장: 정부 기초 재정 흑자(PS) 에 대해서 유로존이 개입하고 경제 주권을 침해하는 것에 대해 저항하다.


- 현재 독일의 역할은 정복자라기 보다는 유럽연합의 ‘규율’을 강조하는 학교 교장 선생 역할을 하고 있다. 왜? 독일이 유럽 연대 기금 3분의 1를 담당하고 있기 때문이다.


- 독일의 그리스에 대한 태도는, 그리스를 독일 보호령 protectorate state 로 간주하고. 그리스 자원을 착취하려고 한다. (사유화를 통해)


- 심지어는 그리스 시리자 정부 교체를 목표로 하거나, 시리자 정권 붕괴를 시도했다.

- 프랑스 좌파들은 그렉시트를 반대한다.

- 미국 역시 2008년 금융공황 이래로, 체계적인 위기 관리를 하고 있기 때문에, 그렉시트와 같은 불안정함에 반대하고 우려를 표명하고 있다.


- 그렇다면 독일의 목표는 무엇인가? 결국 그리스를 핑계로, 이탈리아와 프랑스의 ‘기초 재정 흑자 PS'를 마스트리히 조약 기준와 2012년 기준에 맞추도록 강요하고 있다. (그리스 전임 재무 장관 바루파키스 협상 후기)에 따르면, 독일의 이러한 전술 목표는 결국 프랑스와 이탈리아 길들이기이다.

- 올랭드가 그렉시트를 막아냄으로써 독일에 승리한 것처럼 보인다.

물론 독일의 요구가 관철되어 ‘긴축 통치안’ 내용은 독일 의도대로 통과되었다.


- 이제 다음 3가지 문제들을 살펴보자. 

(1) 채무와 정치경제학

(2) 구조적 불평등과 신 지배질서 (독일)

(3) 민주주의와 극우파 등장


4. 채무와 정치경제학 :통제불가능한 유럽 채무, 여전히 불안정한 유로 통화 체제

An uncontrollable European debt, a still unstable currency

채무 문제는 1) 채무의 소용돌이 카리브디스 Charibdis 와 2) 긴축 통치라는 스킬라 (Scylla) 사이에 진퇴양난이다.


그리스 국가 채무 해법은, 유럽 채무 문제를 ‘그리스 단일 국가’의 문제로 보지 말고, 유럽 전체틀 안에서 봐야 그 해법을 찾을 수 있다. 그리스 채무 위기가 말해주는 것은 특정 체계적인 ‘유럽 위기’이다. 이것은 유럽 전체 국가들의 ‘협동 해결책’을 필요로 한다.

다시 말해서 유로존을 ‘규율 통제와 통합’ 영역에 그치지 않고 집단적인 산업 발전과 구조변화의 관점을 지닌 통일적인 경제 영역으로 만들어 나가야 한다.


따라서 그리스 정부의 ‘빚탕감’과 ‘채무 구조조정’ 제안과 ‘범 유럽 채무 회의’ 틀 안에서 그리스 경제 재건이라는 두 가지 제안들은 진지하게 검토되고 수용될 필요가 있다. 이것은 또한 최근 IMF 가 긴축정책이 그리스에서 효과를 보지 못했다는 결론과도 일치하는 것이다.


- 유럽국가들이 민족주의에 빠져서도 안되고, 정치적 희생양을 만들어서도 안된다. (인종차별, 반-이민자 정책, 남북 유럽 갈등)


- 현재 유로존에서 독일이 취하는 이득이란? 독일이 지속적으로 이웃국가들을 희생양으로 재정 흑자를 달성하고 있다. 장기적으로도 채무 국가들의 이자율 스프레드로 인한 금융 수익을 챙기고 있다.


- 독일은 서남부 유럽국가들의 부패를 비난하기는 하지만, 정작에 부패와의 전쟁에 참여하지 않는다. 왜냐하면 현 체제에서 이익을 보고 있기 때문이다.


5. 구조적 불평등과 신 지배질서 (독일): 불평등, 분열, 그리고 지배의 유럽

The Europe of inequalities, fractures, and dominations


- 채무 문제, 그리고 해결책에서 빠져 나가버린 게 있는데, 그게 바로 유럽 연대를 향한 정치적 의지 문제이다. 장기적인 유럽의 과제는 내부 불평등을 해소하는 것이다.

이 불평등 원인들은 사회적 역사적 원인들이 있고, 이것들은 유럽이 계속해서 서로 분할되고 재통일되는 과정에서 발생한 것들이지, 문화적 차이에 근거한 것이 아니다. 이러한 문화적 차이를 강조하는 것은, 미디어나 정치적 해설가들이 떠들기 좋아하는 ‘유럽 내부 인종차별주의’에 다름 아니다.


- 과거 냉전 시대 동-서 유럽의 차이와 갈등이 이제 유럽 남북으로 축을 바꿨다.

- 유럽 내부 국가들 사이 노동 분할 1) 서남부는 관광 특구 역할 2) 북부에 싼값에 노동력을 제공한다는 시각은 잘못되었다.

- 프랑스 (현재 산업 쇠퇴, 실업율 때문에 고생) 매개자 역할 위치.

- IMF 가 유럽 국가 정부 기초재정(ps) 흑자 문제에 개입하고, 유럽 난민 문제에도 개입하다.


6. 민주주의와 극우파 등장: 유럽 민주주의 부재 속에서, 국가 포퓰리즘

In the absence of European democracy, state populism


(1) 그리스 국민 투표의 의미 - 인민 주권 회복

- 독일을 비롯한 유럽 국가들, 7월 5일 그리스 국민 투표에 대한 비난들, 문제점.

- 유령이 유럽을 배회하고 있다. 인민의 목소리, 인민 (人民)권력이라는 유령이.

- 국가 주권보다 트로이카 제도들이 더 큰 의사 결정을 가질 때, 문제는 그 제도들이 민주적으로 선출된 권력이 아니라는 것이다.

- 경제적인 협상안이 단기적으로 파괴적 영향을 미치고, 장기적으로 우려를 자아내는 긴축통치안이다.


(2) 왜 반-그리스 담론이 나오게 되었는가? “ 그리스를 위해서 유럽 시민들이 세금을 내고 있다.” 이런 프로파간다가 ‘민족주의’ 포퓰리즘을 생산하고 있다.

- 외국인 혐오주의, 독일, 프랑스, 네덜란드, 핀란드에 나타났다. 왜 이러한 극우적 포률리즘이 등장하게 되었는가?

그 이유는, 유럽 경제 위기는 발생했는데, 이를 해결할 유럽 전체 ‘제도들’이 미비하기 때문이다. 현재 유럽 의회는 그런 역할을 하지 못하고 있다. 그 반대로, 반-그리스 정서, 반-독일 정서만 도드라지고 있다. 결과적으로 지금 유럽은 외국인 혐오주의, 반-유럽주의, 반-정치, 집단적 감정 과잉 현상들이 나타나고 있다.


(3) 무엇을 할 것인가?

외국인 혐오주의, 친 나치즘 탄생, 극우파 운동을 막아내기 위해서는?

이러한 흐름에 저항하는, 민주적 개입/참여가 필요하다.

1) 새로운 제도들을 만들어 내야 한다.

2) 유럽 시민들의 목소리를 담아낼 초국적 ‘반-포퓰리즘’ 운동이 필요하다.


- 생태, 노동권, 이주자 소수자 권리, 부정부패 탈세와의 투쟁.

시리자가 주목을 받은 이유가 무엇인가? 위와 같은 운동을 해서 그런 것 아닌가?

시리자 성과도 있었지만, 지금 위험한 상황에 놓여져 있다.


7. 시리자의 전략적 딜레마는 무엇인가

Syriza’s strategic dilemma


(1) 제 3차 구제금융 협상안 = 유럽 채권단 트로이카의 ‘강제 명령’을 실제 집행할 것인가?

그리스 은행들 영업 재개와 유럽중앙은행의 유동성 공급을 조건으로, 그리스 의회는 트로이카 메모랜덤을 가결했다.

제 3차 구제금융 협상안에 대해서, 시리자 중앙위원 과반수 이상이 비판적이었다. 그러나 의회에서는 야당의 도움으로 통과되었다. 대신 시리자 의원들 중 일부가 반대했다.


<첫 번째 딜레마>

- 트로이카 패키지 ‘제 3차 구제금융 협상안’의 가치와 조건들에 대한 토론이 이제 그리스에서 시작되었다.

- 독일과 유럽연합은 그리스에 대해 여전히 강경하다.

- 트로이카 채권단이 그리스에 요구한 ‘긴축 통치’ 실행이 어떠한 결과를 가져올 것인가?

- 시리자 정부가 트로이카의 ‘긴축 통치. 강제 명령’을 받아들이면서 동시에 그리스 내부 개혁을 수행할 수 있는가?


(1) 그리스 시리자 정부의 자율성 확보

(2) 사회복지 축소로 인해서 피해당할 그리스인들을 어떻게 구제할 것인가?

(3) 부정부패와의 전쟁은 어떻게 수행할 수 있을 것인가?

실제로 그리스 내부 구조 개혁을 치프라스 정부가 할 수 있겠는가?


- 아니러하게도, 역설적이게도 그리스 시리자에 대한 외적 지원은 IMF로부터 왔다.

최근 IMF 제안서에 따르면, 유럽 채권단 트로이카가 제시한 ‘긴축’안을 가지고서는 그리스 채무 문제를 해결할 수 없기 때문에, 그리스 부채탕감을 해줘야 하고, 유럽이 그리스에 원조를 더 해야 한다고 주장했다. 유럽채권단과 트로이카, 특히 독일의 강경한 입장 조건 속에서, 이러한 IMF의 제안을 폄하하기는 어렵다.

- IMF는 현재 정치 경제 지형에서 ‘내적 모순들’을 만들어내고 있다.

- IMF 역할이 ‘반대 조정자 reverse mediator' 역할을 하고 있다. 다시 말해서,

국제 금융 이해관계와 유럽 내부 정치 목표 사이 균형을 의미한다.


- 혹시 IMF 개입이 의미하는 바가, 재협상의 시작인가?

지금 당장은 유로존 국가들이 그리스에 ‘긴축안’을 실행하라고 압박을 가할 것이다. - 쇼이블레는 또다시 ‘한시적 그렉시트’를 다시 가동하려 할 것이다.

충돌은 불가피하다는 이야기이다.


<두 번째 딜레마>

그리스 내부 상황 (사회적, 도덕적, 정치적) 차원이다.

- 대안은, 그리스 시리자 치프라스가 ‘솔직해야 한다’, 오류는 시인하고 당당하게 시민들에게 용서를 구할 것은 구해야 한다. “제 3차 구제금융 협상안은 최상의 것이 아니었고, 재앙을 회피하기 위한 선택이었다” 등


- 그리스 국민들 사이 내부 분열을 극복해야 한다. 그렇지 않으면 내부로부터 국론은 분열될 것이다.

- 그리스 시리자의 승리: 7월 5일 국민투표는 비밀스런 트로이카의 장막 정치를 걷어냈고, ‘정치의복원’을 일궈냈다. 쇼이블레, 융커, 데이셀블룸, 반대표는 그렉시트를 의미한다고 협박했는데 이를 극복했다. 민주주의 원리라는 측면에서 그리스 시리자는 승리했다. 그러나 그 이후, 시리자와 치프라스는 힘에서 트로이카에 밀리고 말았다.


- 시리자 내부 <레프트 플랫폼>은 적들을 이롭게 해서는 안된다.

- 유의미함 인정: <레프트 플랫폼>은 민주적 실천을 수행하고 경험했다.

- 또 치프라스 반대자들도 단일한 시각이 아니다. <레트프 플랫폼>과 콘스탄토풀루-바루파키스는 서로 다르다. 후자는 새로운 유럽을 위해 새로운 그리스를 건설하자고 외치고 있다.


- 제안: 시리자 통일 단결해야 한다.

- 만약 시리자가 분열하면, 무슨 일이 일어날 지는 아무도 예상할 수 없다. 그리스와 유럽 전역을 일깨운 운동의 희망은 사라질 지도 모른다.


8. 유럽을 위한 대장정, 우리의 연대

‘Long March’ for Europe: our solidarities


- 시리자 치프라스 Vouli 방송 연설:

“우리의 선택은 최선이 아니었다. 중단없이 올리가히와의 전투에 나서야 한다.

트로이카가 더 부추긴 부정부패와도 싸워야 한다.“


- 유럽의 운명, 그리스는 유럽의 충돌과 도전의 심장부에 있다.

- 우리가 그리스 시리자를 지원해야 하고 연대해야 한다.

- 우리가 반대할 것은, 테크노크라시, 엘리트 부정부패, 인민 경멸, 기초 재정 흑자에 대한 압력과 트로이카의 그리스에 대한 ‘긴축’ 강제명령(diktat) 이다.


- 현재 유럽 국가들 상황 정리:

(1) 그리스 아테네 신탁마 광장 뿐만 아니라, 신-자본주의 요새인 독일에서도 대안적 저항들은 일어나고 있고,

(2) 스페인에서도 (포데모스 이외에도)

(3) 프랑스에서도, 사회민주주의가 이제 공화주의적 애국주의로, 경쟁적 파괴, 그 문화의 상업화로 변모하고 있는 프랑스에서도,

(4) 이탈리아에서도, 유럽 국경의 군사화와 요새화에 반대하고 있고,

(5) (공공기업의 사유화 문제로 인해서 촉발) 영국에서는 고립주의에 대한 찬반 토론이 활발해지고 있다.


- 유럽 좌파의 공통 구호는 긴축 통치에 대한 민주적 혁신과 저항이다.







.


The Brussels diktat: and what followed

Alexis Tsipras won the battle on a question of principle - the need for a new Europe - even if he lost the war that ensued. What are the implications for the Greek left and for Europe? (Long: 9,000 words) Français. Deutsch.

Alexis Tsipras, February 2015.Alexis Tsipras, February 2015. Demotix/indiPHOTOpress. All rights reserved.Does the unjust and forced ‘agreement’ between the Greek government (now facing the task of ratifying the agreement in the Vouli) and the other states in the European Union (not all of whom feel the necessity for such a sanction) mark the end of one era and the beginning of another? In many ways yes, but almost certainly not in the sense indicated to us by the 'Summit' report. In reality, the agreement is fundamentally unenforceable in economic, social and political terms, though it will be ‘forced through’ by a process that promises to be at least as brutal and even more divisive than the extremities we have seen over the last 5 years.

It is therefore necessary to try to understand the implications of the agreement and to discuss its consequences, avoiding all use of rhetoric but not of engagement or passion. 

In order to do so we must first look at how the negotiations unfolded (those opened by Alexis Tsipras’s return to Brussels on the back of his ‘triumph’ in the July 5 referendum – which, for good reason, has not ceased to fuel incomprehension and criticism among his supporters in Greece and abroad), and secondly we must look at what these negotiations tell us about the positioning of the various European forces.

We must define the stage that the crisis in the EU has reached (a crisis of which Greece is both the symptom and the victim) in terms of three strategic domains: firstly the debt situation and the effects of the austerity measures; secondly the division of Europe into unequal zones of prosperity and sovereignty; and finally the collapse of democratic systems and the resulting rise in populist nationalism.

But first, it is vital that we include an ‘assessment’ of the Brussels agreement: ‘as seen from Athens’ (from the Greek people’s point of view) and ‘as seen from Europe’ (which does not mean as seen from Brussels, whose institutions clearly have no awareness whatsoever of the current European climate).

The ‘agreement’ from the Greek perspective 

Seen from Greece, the agreement seems to be well and truly like a diktat. Varoufakis went so far as to mention ‘Versailles’, a provocative allusion to the 1918 treaties which had the well known repercussions for German history and for the fate of the world. The accusation was sufficiently serious and credible for Merkel to state immediately that she is unconcerned with ‘historical comparisons’… This dramatized illustration is justified for two closely linked reasons.

The first is this: even though Tsipras’s July 7 proposals in Brussels constituted a large concession on his part (accepting, in the main, the proposals of budgetary and economic austerity that he had previously refused, in particular those concerning retirement and taxation), they were nevertheless integrated into a Greek government project (so as not to say a ‘plan’) of adjusting Greece’s economy and finances, whereby, under conditions that would have certainly been more difficult than desirable, he could have hoped to develop his own political strategy in the interests of his people.  Incidentally, this is why Tsipras went along with the repeated demands for an adjustment of the debt (demands increasingly supported by renowned economists with very different orientations - both from the IMF and independent of it).

Under repeated pressure from the German minister for finance and the president of the Eurogroup speaking in his name, it is precisely this last attempt at rationality and coherence that Greece’s interlocutors immediately set about destroying, talking of their ‘loss of trust’ in the Greek government (a purely moral argument) and imposing punitive measures without any economic rationale.

The result has been an anti-plan of improvement that resembles bleeding the Greek population’s remaining resources (notably the resources of the poorest strata of society, those who are already right up against humanitarian catastrophe) and carving up the national economy in preparation for completely unpredictable ‘ideological’ privatizations. In this respect, measures like raising the retirement age are particularly significant – absurd if not criminal in an economy where youth unemployment is almost 60% – not withstanding the preventive ‘seizure’ of Greek assets that is reminiscent of a usurer taking guarantees (even if Tsipras, in an extremely difficult situation, managed to avoid the establishment of a local version of the Treuhandanstalt in Luxembourg, in an establishment which… is also headed up by Schauble!).

Europe conducts itself with respect to Greece in this instance, both as a usurer and as a predator, the objective not being to maintain the viability or growth of its resources, but instead to drain them until exhaustion. Whatever this anti-politics may be – rationalized in the eyes of some (perhaps in good faith) by the dogmas of a monetarist orthodoxy inscribed in ‘golden letters’ in the European treaties that have been signed since Maastricht, and reinforced by the ‘budgetary pact’ of 2012 – it clearly does not constitute any sort of justification since we are no longer at the beginning of the crisis, and all the European leaders (including the German ones) have observed the enactment of the regressive effects of the policies that they have imposed at their leisure. 

They know very well that Greece’s national debt, having doubled in 10 years, has not reached 180% of GDP because of its absolute growth (comfortably outdone, even in proportion to population, by other European countries), but instead as a result of the collapse of production and consumption. Therefore, it is not a question of rationality, nor of the creditors’ interests, but of political vengeance and the humiliation of an ‘interior enemy’. This is confirmed when we see that each measure that has been imposed corresponds exactly to a reversal of social or economic politics that Tsipras’ government was engaged in during its electoral programme and when it took office.

We must now move on to the second reason which allows us to talk of a diktat; perhaps an even more serious one and in any case a motive that is destined to seal the former: the measures of ‘trusteeship’ that create a protectorate within the EU and that are based on the model of ancient colonial practices but applied this time to one of its members (whom we demand thereafter to be symbolically ‘co-responsible’).

Undoubtedly the most blatant measure regards the sovereignty of parliament; the obligation to submit economically and socially sensitive draft legislation to the control and authorization of ‘institutions’, notwithstanding of course a ‘verification’ by these same institutions – the result of which will allow the release of European loans. To illustrate the functioning of this mechanism: the ‘Memorandum of Understanding’ has already imposed a series of predetermined legislative acts without delay (preliminary to the implementation of the agreement), cancelling existing legislation and replacing it. Together, the acts represent a programme of extreme neo-liberal transformation (without equal in modern Europe) of the right to work and of administration (which is not lacking in irony when we note that one of the principles is actually supposed to be the ‘depoliticisation of administration’!).

We have also noticed the demand for the ‘independence’ of statistical tools (arising after the Greek authorities’ carried out an ‘audit’ of their debt and its legitimacy), a demand guaranteed by the Troika experts’ return to Athens (whose level of personal independence is indeed beyond suspicion). Finally, it must be mentioned that the necessity for a governmental reshuffle (meaning the entry of anti-Syriza parties and the expulsion of the ‘radicals’) is a foregone conclusion in the corridors of the Brussels Commission. Materially, this means that the austerity measures and the trusteeship reinforce one another as policies, so that Greece is no longer a sovereign nation (in any sense since this process started years ago and was only halted by Syriza’s rise to power).

Unfortunately what this means is not that Greece is entering into a shared sovereignty – judicially equal and politically organized as would imply a progression towards European federalism – but instead that it is bowing to the will of the master. Which ‘Master’, however, are we talking about? It is at this point that we must look at the other side of the coin: the European Union.

Europe’s new constitution

We must do so by looking again at the facts and their historical significance, but also more deeply, by defining the material constitution presiding over modern Europe: the division of powers; the institutional shifts resulting from the Treaties and from the enactment of the treaties; the relationships between economic and political (and geo-political) forces; the hierarchy of interests codified by ‘rules’ and ‘principles’ for which states and their populations are forced to bend over backwards; the decision procedures (or as we say nowadays, the ‘governance’ procedures); the inequality of access to real power for different social and national groups and the impossibility of influencing it, etc. In short, we must ask ourselves what sort of ‘regime’ is modern Europe under?

Let us not revisit entirely what should already have become obvious, that is to say the institutionalization of neo-liberalism since the 1990 milestone that came in the form of the dogma of ‘free and fair competition’ whose ‘revolutionary transformative’ effects can be seen across society today – the EU’s equivalent of the Soviet Union’s state socialism.

If only to remind us that the belt is now tightened: neoliberal ‘liberty’ is essentially coercive.  It involves – wherever ‘deviations’ or ‘failures’ are identified (essentially among the ‘debtors’ and the ‘weak’) – incessantly forcing citizens to be free (as Rousseau ­– who would never have imagined this sinister use of his formula – would have said). Clearly, the degree of coercion varies enormously depending on one’s position on the scale of real power.  But more precisely: when the Greek and Italian governments were replaced by a constitutional manipulation (2011) and the preceding Greek referendum prohibited, the ‘revolution from the top down’ – which was set up at the beginning of the public budgets crisis and the arbitration in favour of the banks – was thenceforth a ‘fait accompli’. Habermas talked of postdemokratischer Exekutiv-föderalismus, a highly enlightening concept. 

But this ‘post-democratic executive’ that has taken effect on the (quasi) federal tier – because the federalism being built in Europe on extraordinarily fragile foundations comes entirely from the top – has the remarkable property of being only partially visible and institutionally legitimate. To a great extent, it remains occult and informal, which is clearly illustrated by the fact that the ‘European Commission’ no longer has the power of political initiative, nor of mediating the interests of the member states. Jean-Claude Juncker (president of the European Commission), threw in the towel – having already had to resign himself to a humiliating recoil a few weeks ago – after  a crucial question over the future of Europe arose regarding the hosting of refugees and the solidarity between states before the humanitarian catastrophe in the Mediterranean. The Commission, being now no more than a (proliferating) regulatory structure and a transmission belt, lost the power of negotiation to the Eurogroup: a group established by no treaty and following no rule, whose internally elected president then serves as a spokesperson for the most powerful and most influential of the member states – Germany, in other words. 

So, one power structure conceals another. Nevertheless, we must not hasten to conclude that the material constitution of Europe is simply a mask for ‘German Imperialism’, even if such imperialism really exists. Because in some ways, the German hegemony that is currently active in Europe has no choice but to be indirect, aided or not by context (in the case of the ‘Greek punishment’, incidentally, it benefited from a multitude of favourable conditions). In other ways it is partial, dependent on challenges coming from several adversaries who also participate in the ‘power bloc’ to varying degrees, adversaries who bring with them potentially deep divisions.  Undoubtedly, among these adversaries there are other European countries (the coalition of which might eventually be able to equal the German hegemony, except – as we have clearly seen in recent weeks – that they are held back within and without by their financial, and increasingly their ideological, dependence), and also – and of this we are convinced – the European Central Bank (ECB). 

Because the interest of the German economy (which wants to secure a privileged position in the world market) is not the same as the banking system’s economy (whose vault-key is the ECB, led by a former employee of Goldmann Sachs), it would be completely erroneous to assume that Berlin and Frankfurt are in harmony (in the same way, incidentally, as Mr Schäuble’s aggressive moralism is not the same as the speculative pragmatism of the monetary institution, as we have seen in the periodic conflicts between Mr Draghi and Mr Weidmann). This is why, when discussing ‘neoliberalism’, it would be prudent to be wary of the generalizations common amongst the members of the extreme left, because a common ideological framework does not dictate one sole politic and does not resolve conflicts of interest. 

Without doubt, the ECB played a decisive role during the episode which just unfolded, a role one has even labelled ‘terrorist’: by cutting off the cash assets to Greek banks, the ECB forced the Greek government to close them and to establish capital control, thereby placing the country’s economy on the brink of asphyxia and compelling Tsipras to choose between surrender and chaos. Schäuble and Dijsselbloem took advantage of this blackmail,  a fact that does not indicate, however, that this alliance works automatically. Draghi certainly did not want Greece to leave the euro (whilst Schäuble paid little attention and might have actually wanted Greece to leave in order to ‘tighten’ the zone around Germany): he took a risk and it paid off (for the moment).  The long term picture is a different one altogether. The division within the synthesized European ‘governing body’ is also part of its ‘material constitution’.

At this point we can begin to contextualize the assertion made above: that the agreement constitutes a fundamentally unenforceable diktat made up of ‘unrealistic and unachievable reforms’, (from Le Monde 14.07.2015, a journal, in actual fact, that has relentlessly pushed for the adoption of these reforms), a diktat that will be implemented by force to the point of absurdity.  Clearly, this will depend on the opposition that it sparks (within Greece and, one would hope, outside Greece, because it concerns all of Europe and all of Europe’s citizens), opposition that will grow and gain credibility as the contradictions and destructive effects of the diktat are exposed. But the opposition will depend on the consequences of the increasingly varied strategies being employed by the European states with regard to the crisis.

At this point and before penetrating the heart of the current contradictions, a digression would be a good idea, one that might help us reveal what resulted from the negotiations of the Brussels agreement of July 12-13.

‘Brussels night’ reveals Franco-German divisions

In general, political observers agree to divide up the European states into four groups with regards to the ‘Greek crisis’ and its logical solution (setting aside Great Britain, who does not count in this affair, especially since it is itself busy discussing an eventual ‘Brexit’): Germany and its more or less satellite countries, who align themselves to German politics or pre-empt it (so as to serve as figureheads for the most ‘merciless’ German demands – dixit Le Monde); the ‘poor countries’ of northern and eastern Europe who ‘conceded important sacrifices’ in order to access the eurozone and who do not want the Greeks to ‘benefit’; the ‘indebted’ countries of southern and western Europe who accepted the austerity measures that were rejected by the Greeks and fared variously in the aftermath; finally France (and in some sense Italy), who are not really complying with the regulations of the ‘agreement on budgetary discipline’, but who nevertheless wish to be considered as core members on the European ‘executive board’. 

In reality, this classification boils down to two groups, because the anti-Greek competition between different European countries – other than France and Italy (‘we can no longer be confident’, ‘we no longer agree to pay’) – was directly used (if not orchestrated) by Germany in the Greek affair (where the ‘Schäuble line’ prevailed over the ‘Merkel line’ in German politics). France alone, tacitly supported by Italy, took a (moderately) different position (in particular on the question of the Grexit).

Understanding the Franco-German division is the key, therefore, for at its base it is pretty decisive, but evidently not for the reasons defended by the French presidency.

With regard to the German government and its ‘inflexibility’, we believe that ideology and politics have always played a more fundamental role than economics (even if it is true that the German banks still have a huge chunk of Greece’s net-worth, and that the German budget provides nearly a third of the European Solidarity Fund’s resources). They reveal as much about German interior politics as the objective to create a continental hegemony – this ‘German Europe’ which Ulrich Beck described in his now famous book; not as a conquest but more like the project of a schoolmaster. 

The two schemas devised by the Bundesfinanzministerium and opportunistically leaked just before the reconvening of the Eurogroup – the interim Greek exit from the euro (a temporary arrangement, which everyone knew would become permanent); or the reduction of Greece to a protectorate state, and the expropriation of its resources – were equal in substance (from a political point of view), especially if one remembers that in both cases the ultimate objective was actually to destroy the Tsipras government. The second schema prevailed, due to the first’s difficulties of ‘principle’: it remains to be seen whether it will carry its project through successfully (though it seems pretty close already).

So what happened on the French side of the crisis?  Firstly we could hypothesize, that in contrast to the Germans, at some point Hollande became convinced that the only way of ‘forcing’ the austerity measures on the Greek people was by ‘advising’ Tsipras to make Syriza shoulder their weight (though this task will be much more difficult – if not impossible – given the extreme nature of the measures imposed by the European summit). The referendum itself (which infuriated the Germans and hardened their resolve to ‘smash’ the Greek government) played a role in this sense.  After all, Hollande himself has some experience in breaking electoral promises and must have found it easy to imagine that others might do the same…

Two other factors weighed in to make him risk everything to ensure that there would be no Grexit: the opinion of the French left – which mostly supported Syriza – on the consequences of Greece’s expulsion; the conviction of America’s hostile attitude towards the Grexit which stemmed from the dangers that would arise in the financial international monetary system (since 2008 the USA has nurtured an obsession with ‘systemic risk’). But the key is undoubtedly the issue raised by Varoufakis in his article in the Guardian on July 10, 2015: Germany is using the Greek situation to ‘discipline France’, to impose budgetary discipline – which France is in fact incapable of putting into practice – and to manipulate public opinion on the ‘sanctions’ which should result. Again, the issue is political; it raises as many questions about the distribution of power in Europe as about control over the dominant discourse. On that fateful night, one might say that Hollande (perhaps helped by Merkel against her own minister) ‘won the battle’ to keep Greece in the euro. But he undoubtedly ‘lost’ on the conditions which were imposed for that, and because it is these conditions that will determine what follows, we can assume that his apparent ‘victory’ will not carry him very far…

The unresolved problems – inflamed by last week’s standoffs – are inextricably ‘Greek’ and ‘European’ problems. Despite having to examine them alternately and from both angles, in reality, this means once again that they demonstrate to what extent Europe’s destiny is at stake in the Greek question, and to what extent the Greek decisions (their resistance, propositions, and eventually their errors and failures) lead to consequences for the whole of Europe today. 

Three general questions thrust themselves to the fore more prominently than ever: the debt and political economy; the structural inequalities and new relationships of domination; democracy and the danger of the extreme right.

An uncontrollable European debt, a still unstable currency

Let us begin with the debt. It seems appropriate to remind ourselves of something obvious: the cumulative European debt – public and private – is still growing and generating its own toxic derivatives, and is therefore putting the stability of the euro in permanent danger.  It possesses neither – in contrast to the USA – a compensation mechanism in the form of a universally accepted and hoarded reserve currency, nor a central bank which is authorized to ‘lend as a last resort’, and therefore involves both speculative risks and risks of economic stagnation such as those that we are seeing at the moment. 

Most attention is being paid to public debt. because: the States – since the 1880s – has been massively engaged in institutional dependence on the financial markets; the bailouts and provisions of liquid assets to private banks by the ECB (except when it is a question of putting pressure on the Greek government) have had the result of continually transferring the risk of speculative operations onto the citizens as taxpayers; the neo-liberal political discourse has not stopped chastising the ‘spendthrift’ States. In actual fact, the bulk of the debt is private; debts that force economies to hover between the Charybdis of indebtedness and the Scylla of austerity policies. 

This problem applies to Europe as a whole (even if the common currency is not adopted by all its countries at the present time, and no doubt never will be). The Greek debt represents without doubt a particular systemic risk (which we are not reducing by strangling the Greek economy or strangling its repayment possibilities!), but it is the whole system that is engaged on an unhealthy course that would call for a joint solution – in other words restructuring as part of the eurozone’s conversion into a coherent economic space, not only integrated or ‘disciplined’ but oriented towards a perspective of collective industrial development and transformation. 

Hence the pertinence of the Greek government’s proposal to examine the conditions of its own debt reduction and of its revival in the framework of a ‘pan-European conference on debt’, – taking into consideration all the variables in the problem and also taking the various stakeholders into account – a proposition swiftly ruled out by the ‘institutions’ who did not even listen to them. The Greek suggestion was indeed converging with the IMF’s conclusions after it discovered the ‘mistaken calculation’ at the heart of its previous austerity plan for Greece (which led it to no practical conclusions). 

At this point, we might ask ourselves about the reasons behind the unrelenting and insurmountable obstacle that prevents Europe from confronting its financial problem rationally and on an appropriate level: what is it that ceaselessly strives to find scapegoats? Nationalism and short-term egoism, plainly, together with the aforementioned ideological obsessions, but also banking interests and, once again, the anti-communitarian behaviour of one country (Germany), a country which ceaselessly submits budgetary surpluses at the expense of its neighbours and which has benefited over the long-term from the considerable ‘transfers’ from indebted countries by making a profit on the financial markets from the spread of national interest rates. We can see why Germany will not be pressed to become involved in a common struggle against corruption and tax evasion in its neighbours to the south, whilst it is also the loudest critic of this corruption as it tries to justify its imposition of trusteeship. In the same breath, Germany relentlessly places the value and stability of a currency in danger, a currency whose character it has proclaimed to be sacrosanct.

The Europe of inequalities, fractures, and dominations

The debt question and its missing solution – a solution based on the political will for a continental solidarity – raises a second issue, one that is more worrying still for European futures: the development of internal inequalities. They do not have a clear shape because they result from social and historical causes which are immersed in the history of the continent as a whole, and also because they stem from its successive divisions and reunifications (neglecting here the rhetoric on ‘cultural differences’ which the mass media and certain political commentators are fond of, with a flavour of intra-European racism ). 

Nevertheless, we might say that having tended to sway towards an east-west axis (reinforced by the political divisions in Europe and by the heterogeneity of its economic systems during the Cold War period) its internal inequalities now seem to be based on a north-south axis. The pseudo-economic resolution of the Greek crisis – coming after the ‘solutions’ enforced in Spain and Portugal (where public accounts and the reliability of banks were reestablished at the expense of an explosion in unemployment) – dramatically demonstrate the size of the chasm which is deepening within a ‘unified’ Europe, for whom the initial idea was to connect the reduction in enmities in the wake of war among its peoples, by opening up the prospects of prosperity and synergy.

Obviously, this is the logic of a fanatical economic liberalism, the same fanaticism that was enshrined by the latest generation of treaties: to transform the comparative advantages into the development of inequalities and finally into relationships of domination. Certain analysts on the radical left – spurred on by the history of relations between the planet’s ‘North’ and ‘South’ – see this as an already advanced colonial relationship within the borders of the European continent, including in the form of the Mediterranean region’s ‘specialization in tourism’ and the offer of educated workforces to the northern regions.

From this perspective, France ­(in industrial decline and with a high and unfaltering unemployment rate) would hold an intermediary position, one that is very hard to manage despite its size, and the new member states of Mitteleuropa (having gone through the trial of ‘real socialism’ and converted to the most intransigent market ideology) would specialize in outsourcing to the profit of the dominant region. 

This thesis is a simplified one, especially because it tends not to take into account the social and territorial inequalities that are common internally to every ‘region’ and country – inequalities amplified by neoliberal logic. However, the formulation has the benefit of drawing our attention to both the structuraland virtually hostile character of the polarizations taking place.  For us, a more immediate and concrete consideration should be added, one more closely linked to context: southern Europe (primarily Greece and Italy) is not simply in the process of reproducing forms of dependence and domination at its core, reproductions analogous to colonization (in some ways ‘constructive’ and in others ‘deconstructive’). It is also in organic relations with a new and increasingly unsettled and unsettling ‘South’ (through the intermediary of the Mediterranean space to which it belongs as much as to continental Europe), one that will be impossible to contain behind walls or border operations. Of course, by a new ‘South’ we mean the poverty- and refuge- driven migrations, threatened by civil wars and backlashes from western interventions (whose consequences were never calculated by those who initiated them). 

Our line of argument is clear: if it is illusory to believe that we could be following – or maintaining – ‘European construction’ through such polarization and conflicts of interests (which are increasingly amplified across Europe), it is even more illusory to believe that Europe would be able to exist as a political body which can ‘neutralize’ and ‘hide’ the flows linked to globalization that both stem from and end within. 

What is confirmed for the IMF intervention – an organism that is primarily charged with restructuring economies affected by currency collapse – in the regulation of a budgetary dispute between the members of the euro zone, also holds with regard to migratory flows and new conflicts in the ‘margins’ of Europe. An increasingly divided Europe is also not completely contained ‘within Europe’.  Before disappearing from the scene, Mr Juncker had the time to let out a cry of anger against the ‘egoism’ of the European states who refuse to ‘share’ the burden of refugees: why did he not push clear-sightedness to its conclusion, denouncing the aberration – which consists of dunking Greece’s head underwater –  one of the two states who are facing their arrival on a daily basis? It will be too late after that to build walls in the heart of the Balkans or on the shores of the Danube… 

In the absence of European democracy, state populism

The third is clearly the democratic problem, highlighted in all its severity by the monstrous product of July 13, 2015 – hence the problem of legitimacy of powers in Europe. Time and time again, everyone has repeated it. But it should be approached with all its components and in its current state – moving away from only talking about the formal aspects of the institutional crisis, no matter how important these aspects may be. At least in appearance, the most serious of the arguments invoked before (and a fortiori after) the referendum of July 5 by the European governments in their effort to disqualify the Greek government’s demands for negotiation (over debt, economy, and the future of the country in the European construction) was as follows: the needs of one people or one EU member state (or one member of the Eurozone) cannot outweigh the needs of 18 others (needs which are expressed by their respective governments, basing their legitimacy on regular elections).

This is likely to mirror a ‘communication component’ created in Brussels and repeated in satiety by journal correspondents who are near the Commission (Le Monde and Liberation in France in particular).  It contains the idea that a ‘part’ cannot decide for the ‘whole’ (any more, it should be said, than ‘the whole’ can impose on one ‘part’ the sacrifice of its own existence, except in a totalitarian regime). However, this only applies if, independent of the detail of representative procedures, a contradictory discussion occurred in which the ‘people’ – in the democratic sense of the term (the ensemble of citizens who are to be represented and affected by the final decision) – took part. 

The European techno-structure and the political classes of different countries (who enviously protect their monopoly of ‘mediation’ between the national level and the European level) do not even want to hear it spoken of.  We were still very far from it when certain countries opened referendums in 2005 about the ‘European constitution’ project, even though there were some real moments of discussion and collective participation. But the negative votes obtained in France and in the Netherlands (whatever the complexity of their interpretation might be) were quickly used to disqualify even the idea of popular consultation and to annul their results: conduct which had a massive effect on the disaggregation of civic spirit in Europe and which to some extent explains the violence of the reactions produced by the Greek referendum of July 5. 

A spectre is haunting Europe; the voice of the people – the power of the people, even.  But since the rise in democratic demands goes hand in hand with the growing unease – and in some ways the anger – which is produced by the shifting of political decisions from the nation-state towards supranational institutions and the obscure organisms which are subject to no popular-control whatsoever, a ‘compensation’ package has been put into practice, a package which has disastrous effects in the short term and terribly worrying effects for the future. 

By making the most of the fact that a large part of the dubious sovereign debts were bought up by ‘public’ European organisms, the idea that they are incessantly ‘paying for the Greeks’ (who would do nothing but squander the money that is ‘given’ to them, when in fact most of this money is spent on paying back the interests from previous loans) has been hammered into the minds of the taxpayers of the different neighbouring countries, in addition to the idea that they personally will ‘lose’ considerable sums of money if the Greeks default without offering security (while these losses are virtual sums whose actual impact on the finances of each country depends entirely on the economic context). 

The implementation of this state propaganda which is taking hold of public opinion, generates a populism, or rather an extremism ‘of the centre’ (to employ the expression used by sociologist Ulrich Bielefeld) that is particularly forceful in Germany, but also in France and in the Netherlands, and institutionalized in countries like Finland where its convergence with xenophobia can clearly be seen.  As a result, the economic crisis develops as a gap in representation which is linked to the fact that there is absolutely no institutional possibility for European citizens – whether as individuals, or as territories, or indeed as local, national or transnational communities – to actually control the decisions which are taken in their name (the European parliament being no more than an empty shell, a shell that played no role whatsoever in the examination of the Greek default and its wider consequences, except for the provocative and contemptuous declarations made by its president Mr. Schulz). 

But the crisis is also increasingly taking the form of the revenge of aggressive nationalism (anti-Greek, anti-German) and xenophobia, at once against internal ‘minorities’ and against external competitors, and joining with the development of organized forces, collective passions and anti-political and anti-European discourse.

It is the governments themselves who are the instigators of this massive populism (rarely described as such) and so are the parties forming the ‘great coalition’ of conservatives and social-democrats holding political power in Europe today, in close collaboration with technocracy and finance. But it is the movements of neo-fascists who – to varying degrees – are preparing to do well from the situation and who are already making the most of it by making their presence felt in the daily life of each country.  We have already gone far enough in this direction, whether under the cover of the protection of ‘national identity’ or of the need for ‘defence’ against migrants and minorities.

The ‘democratic invention’ (to echo Claude Lefort) which Europe needs today must happen both in the form of an institutional creation – instituting the principles of representation and deliberation completely missing in all echelons of real power – and in the form of an active citizenship, that is to say a mobilization of the mass of citizens (which one might call ‘counter-populism’) on all fronts which require transnational responsibility (from the freedom of information to the environment, not forgetting workers’ rights, the mobilization of unstable and unemployed migrants, and the fight against corruption and tax evasion).

It is no exaggeration to say that Syriza, before and after its rise to power and in the same way as other European movements (Indignados, Podemos), succeeded in awakening great hopes amongst the most advanced faction of the European left, because it was moving precisely in that direction:  this, without doubt, is no stranger to the obstinacy with which it was attacked with the result that we can see. This is why, in tentative conclusion on this analysis of the diktat of Brussels and its consequences, we arrive – with the prudence that is appropriate when we are speaking from the exterior of a country or of a movement – at some hypotheses and some reflections on the achievements of the Greek left (as well as on the critical situation in which it currently finds itself).

Syriza’s strategic dilemma

The Greek parliament has just adopted the Brussels Memorandum in the prescribed terms (the sine qua non condition for primary rescue funds to be unblocked and banks reopened). The acceptance came as a clear majority, the old parties of government voted in favor but with a strong minority opposition that included about thirty Syriza MPs (after the central committee of the party itself rejected the agreement by a small majority). Tsipras, the prime minister declared (with a phrase that has spread worldwide): he ‘didn’t believe’ in the economic virtues of the Brussels plan, but he had to accept it in order to avoid ‘disaster’ both for Greece and Europe. He thus took responsibility, and he demanded solidarity. Strikes and demonstrations are taking place. What is the lesson to learn from these latest developments? What conclusions can we draw on the immediate future and on the long-term consequences?

The first observation is that the discussion on the value and the terms of the Brussels ‘package’ has begun even before its implementation. This is true in Greece, clearly, but also abroad ­– including within public opinion and in the press organs that ask themselves the question of whether, in going ‘too far’, Germany and the EU have not actually sapped the conditions of their authority. If the answer turns out to be yes, it would mean that the ‘question of trust’ has switched sides… But for this, we will have to wait and see how the implementation takes shape. Once the shock of the new austerity measures has been absorbed by Greek society if it is able to survive them (the first major uncertainty), Tsipras’s government – for its part and if it stays in power (second uncertainty) – promises: an obstinate fight to exploit each trace of and every possibility for autonomy left in the signed documents (a good example being the management of the ‘guarantee funds’ which unify Greek assets); a systematic resistance to the idea that the most impoverished social categories should bear the brunt of the charges, notably the fiscal ones; a renewed offensive against corruption; and a renewed insistence on the question of the structural causes of debt.  None of these will happen without a fight (not long ago we would have said ‘without a class war’…), but all this might shake things up.

Paradoxically, the main ‘external’ support at Tsipras’s disposal in this combat currently comes in the form of statements from the IMF. This is because the IMF is refusing to play the role that Brussels assigned to it, publicizing its radically pessimistic analysis of the ‘supportability’ of the Greek debt, and by calling on Europe to do more to reduce it. It would be difficult to underestimate the importance of this statement of position, in view of its timing.  It signifies that the IMF – recently involved in the attempts to align Greek dependence with the norms of the ‘Third World’ (as in the Argentinian case) – might create internal contradictions in the system by acting as a ‘reverse mediator’. This corresponds to a balancing of the relationship between international financial interests and intra-European political objectives. One might think (or hope) that this marks the creeping beginnings of ‘renegotiation’, even if in the short term it induces all the governments in the Eurogroup to harden their pressure for the ‘fulfilment of the commitments made’. Mr. Schäuble, on his part, never forgetting to play both cards, has seized the occasion to relaunch the idea of a ‘temporary Grexit’.

The second element in the strategic dilemma, more important still, concerns Greece’s interior situation (social, moral, political). Greek society is rich in solidarities that have been defended and used against the barrage of impoverishment and hopelessness over the last months and years. But it is exhausted, and it is divided along lines of class and ideology that could shift at any time, perhaps brutally. This depends on the course of events, but also very much on the way in which governmental action is perceived: as ‘treason’ or as ‘resistance’. In our eyes, it is crucial that Tsipras (just yesterday in his speech at the Vouli and in his letter to the MPs of Syriza) perseveres in his resolution to ‘speak truth’ about the constraints, the perspectives and intentions of his government – by adopting a typically parrhesiastic posture, in the tradition of Greek democracy. It is no less crucial that, under the pressure of great tensions (which could triumph tomorrow), the unity of Syriza on ‘the verge of ruin’ is still resisting. But Tsipras was forced to make changes in his government and to call risky elections in the near future. Let us try to make the conditions of Syriza’s extremely fragile balance more clear.

The first point in question is whether or not Tsipras was right to call the referendum when he did and how he did, taking the double risk of ‘provoking’ the anger of the European powers who wanted to continue to maneuver behind closed doors, and also of producing the immense disillusionment and anger of the people (in particular the young people), people brutally confronted with overwhelming exterior forces and a mockery of democracy. 

On balance, we think that he was, for the reason that – using Chantal Mouffe’s terms that were reused by Ulrike Guerot in Die Zeit – the referendum has traversed the occult ‘governance’, and generated a real ‘return of politics’ in the European crisis that is irreversible in some ways. Questions over the interests and of the voice of the people – notwithstanding those over the publicity of decisions that concern common interest – were clearly raised. Better still, an ideological confrontation took place: the dominant camp of Greece’s rivals (Schäuble, Juncker, Dijsselbloem…) claimed that the aim of the ‘no’ at the referendum was to exit the euro, whilst Tsipras maintained that his mandate, and the proposition which he was submitting to vote, was both to remain in the eurozone and to refuse austerity measures – a demand for a new Europe therefore. Our feeling is that he won the battle on the question of principle, even if he lost the war that ensued due to a crippling combination of forces. 

This immediately takes us to a second question: was Tsipras right to speak of an imminent ‘disaster’ in the face of which the only responsible attitude was to fold without actually collapsing in principle? On this point, the response seems to us to be even more clearly in the affirmative. On one side, the collapse of public finances in Greece and the impossibility of financing economic and daily life was an inescapable reality (whose dark perspectives were highlighted again in the IMF’s report), and in this sense the ‘terrorist’ blackmail worked well. Whilst on the other side, the perspectives for the positive (and even conquering) use of the ‘Grexit’ – being flagged up by the ‘Marxist wing’ of Syriza’s representatives as well as by theorists from both the extreme left and the extreme right – never even had an outside chance of success. If they were not simply expressing fundamental opposition to the idea of the European construction, they were based on an archaic conception of the autonomy of (small) nations in a globalized economy; on inapplicable and authoritarian conceptions of the ‘control’ of monetary politics and of the circulation of capital (a kind of modernization of ‘war communism’); and on a profound lack of consciousness regarding the impact of savage devaluation and competitiveness-at-all-costs on the lives of the working classes. It is true that some might reply that austerity is already insupportable and only promises to worsen, but this brings us back to a former problem: the problem of applying (or not) the terms of the agreement. In any event, the politics of making things worse makes no sense.

The unity of Syriza – as a ‘governmental’ party and above all as a movement – seems to us to be both the most difficult and the most decisive element. It is the most difficult because the rifts are very real, and also because unity cannot be decreed – it depends on social conditions as much as on a political willingness. It is the most decisive because at the present time there is a maximum push from the European ‘centre’ to create a rupture. The German press (Suddeutsche Zeitung) speaks profusely of Syriza’s ‘schizophrenia’ – they want both to uphold their criticisms of the agreement and also to stay in power in order to put it into practice on their own terms. It orders Tsipras to ‘clarify’ his intentions by ‘shedding’ the leftists that surround him, continuing the narrative about ‘lack of trust’ in the process. And the Greek parties once  disqualified by their past politics, who ‘supported’ him in parliament, are lying in wait to replace Tsipras. The ‘rebellion’ of Syriza’s MPs who voted against the agreement seems to us to be absolutely legitimate, and to belong to the democratic experience propelled at the heart of the crisis. But it ought not, without fatal risks, to play into the hands of the adversaries. Besides, the rebellion is not ideologically uniform because only one part of the opponents is motivated by a fundamental hostility to the European construction; others (including such leading figures as Varoufakis and Zoe Konstantopoulou) always demonstrated their engagement in the combat for a ‘new Greece’ leading to a ‘new Europe’ in both words and in deeds. 

If Syriza’s unity holds in spite of the internal tensions (which mirror the same conflicts in the bosom of the Greek people and of public opinion), the government will itself be able to hold on, to resist against pressure from the right and from the extreme right, and so the dialectic of application and of resistance will be able to launch itself. If this unity does not hold, we are entering the unknown, and will bid farewell to the hope that this movement has awakened in Greece and in Europe (and even beyond).  The reader understands where our hopes lie, though they are based on nothing certain. 

‘Long March’ for Europe: our solidarities

In his speech in the Vouli, Tsipras clearly said: the solution that we had to choose was not the best one; it was simply the least disastrous. And he specified: for Greece but also for Europe. It is a consistent position which he has defended since his rise to power, and notably at the moment of the referendum: ‘our mandate is not the exit from Europe’, that the vast majority of the Greek population do not want. Implicitly, our mandate is to fight without respite for the emergence of a new Europe, a Europe in which Greece – free from its oligarchical privileges and from the corruption that was encouraged by the creditors themselves – will have its rightful position and might even serve as a model for others. This was the theme of the article published in May 2015 in Le Monde: ‘Europe is at a crossroads’ (31.05.2015). This unwavering commitment does us a great service, creating responsibilities – if not obligations – for us as well.  

It now appears that the European alternative to the neoliberal construction of Europe stemming from Maastricht – with its destructive effects and its insurmountable contradictions – at least presents itself as a much more difficult task, strewn with many more obstacles than many among us would have believed possible. Europe has undertaken a long journey to rise ‘from the top’ or ‘from the bottom’ out of its constitutional crisis, to invent the conditions of its citizenship, to assemble the forces of its cultural renewal. Greece is, and will be, at the heart of the clashes and the challenges. By testifying our unfaltering support to Greece, down to the daily necessities, based on the appreciation (and free criticism) of the vicissitudes that it is going through, it is ourselves that we will be helping. We must find the forms of this solidarity and make them effective. We must also remember the thing that placed Syriza in the situation in which it finds itself today, that which contributed to the imbalancing of forces and that which facilitated the diktat: it is, to a great extent, the insufficiency of this solidarity (or the ineffectiveness of this solidarity – which amounts to the same thing).

The efforts of the Greeks to keep the extraordinary democratic power alive that was demonstrated in the popular gatherings of Syntagma and in the referendum campaign – and in order to find new points for its application – should be responded to by connecting to it our own capacity to organize movements and campaigns that help to garner support for its cause amongst public opinion (or that in the end converge with it).

These movements and campaigns must be without exclusions, emphasizing internal discussion and therefore embodying the renewal of politics without which there can be no ‘constituent moment’ in Europe. They must cross borders – protecting themselves at all costs from nationalism and ‘populist’ emulation with such nationalist anti-European currents that are clearly on the rise (like the French National Front) – even when it might seem that the denunciation of the same ‘ills’ (technocracy, elitist corruption, disdain for the people, fiscal pressure) might produce a common ground for a parallel rhetoric.

What exactly could be better for this new intra-European internationalism than to find itself gathering in Athens, on the side of the Greek people? But we would like to add that it exists also in Germany, at the heart of what appears to be the ‘fortress’ of neo-capitalism and which is in fact itself filled with contradictions and rich in alternative possibilities; in Spain, alongside Podemos – burdened now with the task of thinking up a new challenge to the system; in France, where social-democracy is converting itself into ‘republican’ patriotism, ‘competitive destruction’ and the commercialization of its culture; in Italy, where the battle against the ‘fortification’ and the ‘militarisation’ of European borders is taking place and where struggles and resistance within and against the crisis continue to be strong, although politically dispersed; in England, where the debate for or against isolationism is about to take place (against a background of the privatization of all of its social services)…

Finally and above all, we need mottoes around which the solidarities – the convergent objectives for democratic renovation and resistance to austerity – from the different regions of the continent can be clearly seen. The audit of the debt undertaken by the Greek parliament is in itself an example – by thereafter giving substance to the idea of a new economy and of a new monetary politics, like those proposed by movements like ATTAC. The invention of new forms of labour organization and struggle, able to cope with the new nature of financialized capitalism, as well as of new social rights and welfare systems, follow from there. Resistance to security politics; the defense of the freedom ofcirculation and information is another objective. And these are not the only ones.

As Alexis Tsipras wrote in 2015: there are two roads opening for Europe. As difficult as it may be to oppose dominant policies, we believe that the choice is always there, more vital than ever. The opportunities must be created. This will take the time that it needs. But it need not wait. 

 

Thanks go to Asher Korner for preparing this translation for openDemocracy from the French.


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정책비교/국제정치2015. 7. 12. 13:33
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2015 7 12

 

독일 재무장관 쇼이블레와 총리 메르켈과 불화설 사실인가?

 

쇼이블레는 그리스의 유로존 탈퇴가 유럽 전체 이익이라고 생각하고 있다. 그가 중요하게 생각하고 있는 것은 (자본주의 시장) 규칙 준수이고 채무자의 의무 이행이다. 따라서 쇼이블레에게는 유로 안정화가 그리스 국가 채무 위기보다 더 중요한 가치이다. 이러한 쇼이블레 생각에 대해서 메르켈은 어떻게 생각하고 있는가? 메르켈은 기본적으로 쇼이블레의 노선에 동의하지만, 그리스 유로존 탈퇴 (그렉시트)시 독일 정부에 쏟아질 국내외 비난과 책임 전가를 우려하고 있다. 메르켈은 독일 국가 이익을 최우선시하는 반면에 유럽 연합 원칙들을 훼손해버린다는 비판으로부터 자유롭고 싶은 것이다.

 

쇼이블레와 메르켈의 관계는 길고 복잡하다. 1972년 쇼이블레가 독일 의회에 진출했을 때, 메르켈은 고교 졸업반이었다. 1998년 쇼이블레가 기민련과 기사련(CDU/CSU) 의회 그룹 위원장으로 재임했을 때, 그는 메르켈을 총비서로 임명했다. 그 이후 기민련 후원금 스캔들 사건이 터지자, 2000년에 메르켈이 쇼이블레의 직위를 계승했다.

 

그리스 국가 채무 해법을 두고 메르켈과 쇼이블레의 차이는?

2010년 그리스 국가 채무 위기시, 쇼이블레는 유럽 문제는 유럽 스스로 해결해야 하기 때문에, 와싱턴에 본부를 두고 있는 국제통화기금(IMF)이 유럽 문제에 개입하는 것을 반대했다. 이와는 대조적으로 메르켈은 그리스 금융 지원에 대한 원칙과 기준들을 공정하게 심사할 제 3의 기구가 있어야 한다는 이유로, 국제통화기금(IMF)의 그리스 금융지원 개입을 찬성했다. 메르켈이 노린 것은 국제통화기금이 개입해야, 그리스 이외에 다른 유럽 국가들이 ‘너도 나도’ 구제 금융 지원을 요구할 때, 엄정한 잣대를 들이댈 수 있다는 것이었다. 이런 메르켈의 구상이 수용되어 독일과 유럽연합의 공식적인 정책이 되었다.

 

그러나 2015년 지금은 쇼이블레의 입장이 2010년 메르켈의 주장보다 더 우위를 점하는 것처럼 보인다.

 

그렇다면 메르켈 총리는 현재 유럽연합의 토대를 형성한 헬무트 수상의 유산을 계승하고 있는가? 그렇지는 않다. 헬무트 콜은 프랑스 사회당 미테랑 대통령과 유럽 통일 구상에 합의했고, 독일 국가 득실을 고려치 않았다. 그러나 메르켈은 유럽 전체 보다는 독일 국가 현안에 관심이 많고, 과거 역사는 크게 개의치 않고 있다. 다시 말해서 메르켈 노선은 헬무트 콜처럼 ‘유럽 연방’이라는 정치적 목표를 향하고 있지 않다. 그럼에도 불구하고 메르켈은 그리스가 유로존을 탈퇴하는 것을 적극적으로 주장하지 못하고 멈칫거리고 있다. 이유는 그렉시트가 발생했을 경우, 모든 책임은 쇼이블레가 아니라 메르켈 자신에게 떨어진다는 사실을 인식하고 있기 때문이다.


73세가 된 쇼이블레가 과연 그 고집을 버릴 것인가?  메르켈과 그의 이너써클의 국제적 체면을 고려해 줄 것인가? 





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SPIEGEL ONLINE

06/12/2015 05:55 PM

Brewing Conflict over Greece

Germany's Finance Minister Mulls Taking on Merkel

By Peter Müller, René Pfister and Christian Reiermann

Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble appears to have given up hope of a satisfactory outcome to the Greek crisis. Unlike the chancellor, he is willing to cut the rope on Athens. But will he dare to dig in his heels and defy Merkel?

It was a dramatic week. One in which the rumors did the rounds that Finance Minister Wolfgang Schäuble was basically as good as gone; that he had fallen out with Chancellor Merkel and was planning a coup. Then, at the end of this turbulent week, Schäuble made a joke.

He left his office at 3:15 p.m. on Thursday and headed to the Chancellery. But before he left, he mentioned to his team that Merkel might finally be about to tell him what she has in store for him. "She's probably going to strip me of my mandate," he said. He paused briefly then laughed and said he was only joking. Of course Merkel wasn't going to throw him out!

Schäuble is extremely good at shrugging off conflict with gallows humor -- a gift that has served him well throughout his lengthy career. He is well aware that a handful of Social Democrats aren't the only ones talking about the widening rift in the government. Insiders who know Merkel well are saying the same. The chancellor has to answer one of the hardest questions she's had to face since assuming office, namely, should Greece be allowed to remain in the euro, or should the whole drama be brought to a spectacular close with a Grexit.

Merkel would like Greece to remain in the euro. Not necessarily at any cost, but she's prepared to pay a high price. Schäuble is not. He is of the opinion that a Greek withdrawal from the euro zone is in Europe's best interests. Which of them is the more intransigent? Merkel, whose popularity serves as the backbone of the EU? Or Schäuble, for whom there is considerable good will among members of parliament, fed up as they are with having to approve one bailout package after another?

Schäuble is convinced that Europe can only succeed if everyone abides by the rules and Greece is prepared to accept what he calls "conditionality," in other words, that credit depends on Greece respecting the terms of its creditors. Merkel basically agrees. But a Grexit could upset the financial markets, and then what? She is reluctant to risk looking like she prioritized national interests and undermined the founding principles of the EU.

His Own Man

It's an emotionally-charged disagreement that reflects the complex relationship between two politicians who do not completely trust one another.

Schäuble is something of an éminence grise in the German government: He became a member of parliament in 1972, when Merkel was preparing to graduate from high school in Templin. In 1998, as head of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group in the Bundestag, he made Merkel his secretary general, but then became enmeshed in the CDU donations scandal. Merkel succeeded him in 2000.

Although she's the one in charge, he intermittently makes it clear that he remains his own man; that he doesn't kowtow to anyone. Appointed finance minister in 2009, Schäuble remarked that Merkel likes to surround herself with people who were uncomplicated, but that he himself was not uncomplicated. He tends to be a little derisory about Merkel, admiring her hunger for power but deeming her too hesitant when the chips are down.

The euro crisis first drove a wedge between them in 2010, when they disagreed on the International Monetary Fund's contribution to the Greek rescue fund. Schäuble was against it, on the grounds that Europe should sort out its problems by itself. Merkel, however, was keen to enlist the help of a body that has clear criteria when it comes to offering aid, and which would therefore prevent the Europeans from making one concession after another. Merkel prevailed.

But they've now traded positions. Schäuble believes that enough concessions have been made to Greece and he's bolstered by the frustration currently rife in his parliamentary group over Merkel's strategy. It will be hard for Merkel to secure majority support if he opposes her, so her fate is effectively in his hands.

Both of them understand the stakes, which is why they are both at pains to keep their disagreement under wraps. Whenever he's asked if he has fallen out with Merkel, Schäuble likes to pull a shocked expression, respond with a barrage of insults and throw out terms such as "amateur economist" -- although this isn't necessarily as bad as it sounds, given that Schäuble describes himself as a "middling economist," at least in comparison to the "great economist" Yanis Varoufakis.

Turning to Euphemisms

When it got out that Schäuble had not been invited to a recent summit at the Chancellery of the Troika, made up of the IMF, the European Commission and the European Central Bank, his spokesman Martin Jäger played down the snub. Government spokesman Steffen Seibert, meanwhile, insisted that "the Chancellor and the Finance Minister have an excellent working relationship that is both friendly and trusting."

As it happened, Schäuble had engineered the summit himself at an earlier meeting of the G7 finance ministers in Dresden. Which isn't to say that he approved of it. His displeasure was noted at the Chancellery but met with bemusement -- after all, it is the Troika's job to reach consensus on dealing with Greece, a fact it feared the Finance Ministry had forgotten.

According to government insiders, Merkel's and Schäuble's spokesmen are now spending much of their time coming up with euphemisms to obscure their bosses' disagreement.

The conflict is not about differences in their respective assessments of the situation. Merkel's people can calculate the extent of Greece's problems exactly. It's a country that in 2012 had to spend over 17 percent of its GDP on pension payments -- a figure unsurpassed anywhere else in Europe. But Athens nonetheless refuses to makes cuts. Neither Merkel nor Schäuble believe that the privatization process is making any headway and are concerned that the Greek government's erratic policies are scaring off investors. The EU Commission has revised growth predictions for this year downwards from 2.5 percent to 0.5 percent.

Where they differ is when it comes to the consequences. Schäuble is well aware that he's the embodiment of the despicable German to most Greeks, and makes an effort to curb his trademark gruffness. When he was visited in Berlin last week by Varoufakis he began their meeting by presenting him with a gift of chocolate euros that he himself had been given by a reporter from a children's TV show. "Yanis, have this nourishment for the nerves," he said. "You're going to need it."

Refusing to be Blackmailed

But once the courtesies had been dealt with, it was down to business. Varoufakis listed his objections to the Troika's proposals for what felt like the zillionth time: No, pensions can't be cut; no, value-added tax cannot be raised as Greece's creditors are demanding -- oh, and Greece would like debt relief. Rather than agreeing to cuts to the tune of €5 billion, Varoufakis asked for a new round of aid, which Schäuble's experts calculated at some €30 billion. "We have a responsibility to Europe,Wolfgang," he told his host.

For his part, Schäuble listened patiently. But he essentially has no desire left to talk to Varoufakis. He's told his people that he feels too old to keep flogging the same dead horses. Moreover, Varoufakis no longer has much say in Athens now that Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras has begun negotiating with creditors himself.

There is nothing Schäuble hates more than being superfluous to discussions. So he told Varoufakis that he had no mandate to negotiate, nor did the chancellor. The Greeks could only talk to the Troika, he stressed, and a political decision could only be made if the Troika accepts the Greek proposals.

However, as far as Schäuble can tell, the Greeks show no signs of progress -- at least not to the extent he deems necessary. He believes that the Greek rescue only makes sense if there is a realistic chance that the country can get back on its feet. Schäuble is eager to rescue the euro, but not to rescue a country that has opted to live at the expense of others and thereby to jeopardize the currency.

Nor will he allow himself to be blackmailed, and in his eyes, that's exactly what Varoufakis' tireless reiteration of Germany's responsibility for keeping the EU together amounts to. After his meeting with Schäuble, Varoufakis gave a talk at the French Cathedral in the heart of Berlin, and called upon Merkel to make what he termed a "speech of hope" to the Greek people. To Schäuble's ears, the appeal sounded suspiciously like a call to pay up, already!

Good Cop, Bad Cop

Officially, the differences between Schäuble and Merkel are explained away as a reflection of their respective tasks. It's Schäuble's job to hold the purse strings and Merkel's to keep an eye on what's happening on the international stage. Will Putin be getting a foot in the door if the euro zone cuts the rope on Greece? Will the country turn into a failed state in the middle of Europe if it no longer has the euro?

This isn't just a matter of good cop, bad cop. Unlike Merkel, Schäuble doesn't need to worry about looking as though he doesn't care enough about Europe. He wrote the book on the EU, penning papers on how to intensify the union when Merkel was still only a freshly-minted member of the cabinet. She, by contrast, has often been confronted by accusations that her EU policy is austerity-driven and nothing else. In terms of Europe, she lacks Schäuble's street cred.

Within the ranks of the CDU, it's often been said that Merkel is squandering Helmut Kohl's legacy. But this is somewhat unfair, given that it was Kohl's often mawkish brand of politics -- that often neglected to do the math - that allowed the euro's built-in flaws. Merkel, on the other hand, turned European policy back into a national issue. She herself never harbored dreams of a European federation.

So far, Merkel has never been overly bothered about going down in the history books. But if she does end up hounding Greece out of the euro, the development will certainly be more than a footnote. Which is one possible reason for her hesitancy. She, not Schäuble, will be the one who has to deal with the inevitable criticism and attacks.

A Sinister Agenda?

That's why she's so annoyed with Schäuble. And he is suspected of having more sinister motives. Could he be out to destroy Kohl's legacy because he has been denied the opportunity to build on it himself? It's a stretch, to be sure, but the fact that many in the CDU are thinking in such Shakespearean terms suggests that they are keeping a close eye on Schäuble.

If he wanted to, Schäuble could easily drum up support for a rebellion against Merkel. In February, when the Bundestag voted to extend financial aid to Greece, over 100 members of parliament stressed it was for the last time -- and only voted in favor of the extension because Schäuble had made his position on Greece clear. Were he to give it the thumbs down, Merkel will have a tough time persuading her party otherwise.

A recent meeting of the CDU parliamentary faction illustrated the extent to which parliament is on Schäuble's side. The session would normally begin with the finance minister giving a brief summary of the state of negotiations with Athens, but this time he merely told his listeners that he had nothing to report. "The situation is the same as it was two weeks ago," he said. "There's been no change."

A wave of mirth went through the room, with parliamentarians laughing in agreement. They knew exactly what he meant: He had lost faith that the Greeks would find a sensible solution. But first and foremost, he was implying that Merkel's involvement had failed to move things along. Schäuble knows full well that the chancellor is not at liberty to bail out anyone as she sees fit. She has to take the IMF into consideration, as well as her counterparts in Germany's partner countries -- some of whom make Schäuble look like he's positively soft on Greece.

Merkel could see the effect of Schäuble's comment and chose not to respond with her own version of events. But she can only hope that he refrains from starting a rebellion. She knows how stubborn he is, but ultimately, he has always ended up toeing the line. He owes his longevity to his resilience. He put up with forever being Kohl's crown prince, and he put up with Merkel passing him over and appointing Horst Köhler president. The expectation in Merkel's circles is that he will now put up with her decision on Greece -- reluctantly, perhaps, but he will be loyal nonetheless.

There is much to back up this theory. "The finance minister needs to accept that the chancellor might not always agree with him," he said in the fall of 2009, shortly after he assumed office. But now that he will be turning 73 this September, he might no longer feel he needs to be as agreeable. Being obstinate, after all, is the prerogative of the elderly.

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정책비교/국제정치2013. 3. 23. 19:33
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좌파 입장에서 본, 그리스 위기출구(좌파연합 시리자 SYRIZA의 10대 프로그램들) 2012.06.14


그렇다면 그리스 위기 (국가 채무 위기), 그리고 트로이카 (유럽연합, 유럽중앙은행, IMF)와 그리스 정부 (주로 PASOK 기존 사민당 연립정부)가 채택한 '긴축정책'를 비판한 시리자 [좌파 연합]의 대안은 무엇인가? 

트로이카는 구제금융을 그리스 정부에 제공하면서 그 대신 최저임금 20% 삭감, 1만 5천명 공무원 해고, 연금 삭감 등 강력한 '긴축 정책'을 강요하고 있다. 이에 [좌파 연합]은 트로이카의 구제금융 자체를 반대하고 수용을 거부했다. 전통적인 의미에서 쁘띠 부르조아 (도시 영세 상인, 자영업자, 농민들), 몰락한 중산층, 그리고 노동 대중들이 이러한 [좌파 연합 SYRIZA]를 지지하고 나섰다. 

1997년 IMF 와 미국의 '긴축정책'을 굴욕적으로 수용하고, 신자유주의 이외에는 대안이 없다던 김대중-노무현 정부, 이명막 정부의 선택과는 다른 결정이 어떻게 해서 가능했는가? 트로이카의 긴축정책은 지난 5년간 그리스 경제를 보다 더 악화시키고, 2011년 3/4분기 그리스 GDP는 7.5% 감소하고 고용창출은 더욱더 악화되고, 특히 청년실업율은 50%를 넘어섰다. 긴축정책과 금융지원 (2차 구제금융, 1천 300억 US달러)은 그리스의 대안이 아니라는 것이다. 트로이카의 구제금융은 다시 은행가들과 거대 비지니스맨들의 손에 들어가고 노동자-중산층 복지와 그리스 경제발전에 기여하지 못한다는 결론을 얻은 것이다. 




(번역: 원시) 

* 자세한 경제적 대안은 다음 기회에 올리도록 해보겠음.

좌파 입장에서 본, 그리스 위기 출구 (SYRIZA의 10대 프로그램들) 

1. 그리스 사람들을 위기로부터 구제할 보호막 형성
-  모든 그리스 시민들에게 최저 소득 보장, 의료보험, 주거, 공공서비스 이용권을 제공.
- 부채 가계 구제책과 보호책 강구.
- (시장) 가격 통제조치들과 가격인하, 부가가치세 인하, 생필품 부가가치세 폐지.

2. 채무 부담 처리 방식

그리스 국가 채무는 단적으로 말해서 계급관계의 산물이고, 그 실체적인 진실을 들여다 봤을때 그것은 비인간적이다. 
왜냐하면 그리스 국가채무의 원인들은 1) 부자들의 납세 회피 2) 공공 기금의 횡령 3) 과도한 군사비 지출에서 비롯되었기 때문이다.

그래서 우리는 다음과 같은 대책을 즉시 실시할 것을 요구한다.
채무 원금 및 이자 지불을 유예한다. (모라토리움 선언 * 채무불이행과 다름)
채무 청산 협상을 실시하되, 사회보험 기금은 보전하고 소액 예금자들은 보호하는 조건으로 한다. 이를 실현하기 위해서 감사통제나 지불 연장과 같은 강구할 수 있는 모든 수단들을 동원한다.

- 경제 발전과 고용 창출을 위해서 잔여 채무를 규제한다.
- 유럽 국가들의 채무에 대해서 유럽 자체의 규제가 필요하다.
- 유럽 중앙 은행 역할에 대한 급진적 변화가 필요하다.
 - 투기 목적의 은행 상품들 발행 금지.
- 전유럽에 걸쳐서 부유세, 금융 거래세, 사업 소득세를 부가한다.


3. 소득 재분배 실시, 부유세 실시, 불필요한 지출 방지

- 세금 징수 구조의 재편과 공고화
- 100만 유로 달러 이상, 대규모 사업소득 개인/기업들에 대한 세금 부과
법인세 뿐만 아니라, 법인세 과세 이후 개인 주주들에게 배당된 이윤에 대한 과세율을 점진적으로 45%까지 인상한다. (*반론자들은 이중과세라고 반대함)
- 금융 거래세 실시
- 사치재 소비에 대한 특별소비세 도입
- 선박 소유자들과 그리스 정교 교회에 대한 면세 폐지
- 은행과 무역 거래 비밀유지 철폐. 탈세와 사회보험세 탈루 방지
- (세금 납세 회피 목적의) 역외 회사들 거래 금지
-  유럽 국가들의 기금들의 효율적인 운용, 2차 세계대전시 독일의 그리스 침략 보상비용 청구, 그리스 정부의 군사비 지출과 예산의 대폭적인 삭감을 통해서 새로운 재정 자원들을 창출해낸다.

4.  사회와 환경의 생산적인 재구성

은행들을 국유화시키거나 사회화한다. 즉 은행들을 일종의 공공 은행 시스템으로 통합해서 전 사회적 통제나 노동자들의 통제하에 운용되도록 한다. 이를 통해서 전 사회 구성원들의 삶의 발전이 성취될 수 있도록 한다.

-불공정하거나 부당한 은행의 재자본화는 즉각 중단되어야 한다.
- 지금까지 민영화된, 전략적인 중요성을 지닌 모든 공기업들의 국유화한다
-공기업들은 투명성 보장, 사회적 통제와 민주적 계획이라는 원칙들에 근거해서 운영되어야 한다.
- 공공재 제공을 위한 지원 실시
- 소위 '사회 영역(*비영리/비-정부 단체 등과 같은 사회영역)' 에서 중소기업들과 협동 (코업 Co-op)회사들에 대한 지원과 공고화 (강화 방안)
- 에너지 생산, 제조업, 관광산업, 농업 발달을 보다 생태친화적인 방향으로 변화시킨다.
- 이러한 개혁 방향은 영양 풍부함과 사회적 필요 충족을 가장 우선시할 것이다.
- 과학적 조사와 생산적 전문화의 발전 필요

5. 적정 수준의 임금과 사회 보험을 보장하는 안정적인 고용 보장
- 굴욕적인 수준으로 임금저하되고 노동권리의 지속적인 훼손으로 말미암아 투자, 발전, 고용 등이 오히려 악화되고 있다.

이를 타개하기 위해서 우리는 다음과 같은 사항을 요구한다.
-소득 및 노동권이 보장된 고용, 그리고 사회보험 혜택을 받는 고용 창출
-최저임금의 즉각적인 재법률화, 3년 이내 실질 임금의 재법률화
-단체교섭의 즉각적인 재법률화
-고용안정을 보장할 강력한 통제기구 형성
-체계적인 해고 방지책, 그리고 노동관계(제도,계약,법률,노조 등)의 탈규제에 대한 체계적인 억제책 마련

6. 민주주의의 심화: 모든 시민들을 위한 민주적인 정치-사회적 권리 확장

-그리스의 민주주의가 축소되고 있다. 점차적으로 권위적인 경찰국가로 변질되고 있다. 따라서 우리는 다음과 같은 사항들을 주장한다.

-인민주권의 복원과 정치영역에서 의회 권력의 업그레이드. 이를 위해서
1) (의회에서) 비례대표 제도의 창출
2) 권력 분립
3) 국회의원 면책 특권 폐지
4) 국회의원의 경제적 특권 폐지
5)아테네 중심의 중앙권력을 분산시켜, 건전한 지방 정부 재정과 자원과 확장된 사법권을 가진 명실상부한 지방정부를 창출한다.
6)전 사회에 걸쳐 노동자들의 직접적인 통제와 사회적 통제 하에서 직접 민주주의원리가 작동되고 자주적인 제도들이 운용되도록 한다.
7)정치와 경제 영역에서 부패 추방
8) 민주적 정치적 권리, 노동조합 권리의 실질적인 증진
9) 가족 생활, 고용, 공공 행정부에서 여성과 청년의 권리 신장

-이민법 개정

난민 (보호) 신청 과정을 신속하게 처리한다
더블린II 규정(*유럽연합 난민/망명 관련 규약) 을 폐지하고,이민자들에게 여행권리 보장
이민자들에게도 국내인과 동일한 권리 부여 및 사회적 통합

-현행 공무원들을 적극적으로 행정에 참여시키면서 동시에 행정과 공무의 민주적 개혁 시도
-해안 경비대와 경찰의 탈-무장화와 민주화. 특공대 해체

7. 강한 복지국가의 복원

(유럽연합 EU, 유럽중앙은행 ECB, 국제통화기금 IMF 를 지칭하는 트로이카)와의 협약 하에서 반-사회보험법, 사회 서비스 중단, 사회복지비의 대폭 삭감으로 인해서 그리스에서 사회적 부정의와 불공정이 만연해 있다.

이를 타개하기 위해서 다음과 같은 조치들이 필요하다

1) 연금 제도의 즉각적인 구제: 연금은 피-고용자, 고용인, 정부 3주체가 분담하고 점차적으로 이것들을 하나의 보편적인 공공사회 보험 제도로 통합 운영한다.
2) 실업 보험의 경우, 임금보전율이 원래 임금의 80%에 이르도록 한다. 실업보험의 100% 적용을 목표로 한다. 
3)최저 소득 보장 제도 도입 
4) 사회적 취약계층과 빈곤층을 위한 포괄적이고 종합적인 사회복지 제도 도입

8. 건강은 공공재이고 사회적 권리이다.
- 보건의료 서비스는 무상으로 지원되어야 하고, 그 재정은 공중 보건 제도를 통해서 확보될 것이다.

이를 위해 다음과 조치들이 취해져야 한다.

-병원 기능 향상 및 지원. 사회 보험 제도의 건강 인프라 향상. 
- 제 1차 진료의 통합체계를 확충발전
-보건의료 종사자와 장비 확충, 이를 위해 보건의료 종사들의 해고 중지. 
-그리스에 거주하는 모든 사람들이 의료 진료를 무상으로 받을 수 있게 한다.
- 저소득 연금 생활자, 실업자, 학생, 만성병으로 고생하는 사람들을 위해서 무상 건강 검진과 약품 제공.

9. 트로이카와의 협약 하에서 실시되는 긴축정책에 반대해, 공공 교육,연구조사,문화, 스포츠의 보호

-교육 정책과 관련해서 다음과 같은 사항들을 요구한다.
- 보편교육, 공공교육, 무상교육의 강화 및 공고화: 이를 실현하기 위한 교사,교육종사자, 교육 인프라를 즉시 확보한다.

- 14학년 통합 교육의 의무화
- ( 교육부  장관 ) 아나 디아만토포우로우 법 폐지 (대학입학 관련 법) 
- 대학의 자치운영권 보장
- (자본이나 경영논리가 아닌) 대학의 학문 연구 기능과 공공성 보장

10. 평화 증진에 복무하는 자주적인 외교 정책 수립

-미국과 유럽연합의 몇몇 강국들의 정치적 욕망에 그리스 외교정책을 굴복시킴에 따라, 그리스의 자주, 평화와 안전은 악화되고 위험에 빠졌다.

따라서 우리는 다음과 같이 제안한다.
-다자간 평화 추구 외교 정책 수립
NATO로부터 탈퇴. 그리스 영토에서 외국군대 기지 철수
-이스라엘과의 군사 협조 종식
-사이프러스 시민들의  사이프러스 섬의 통일 노력 지원 (터어키계와 그리스계 갈등 해소) 
- 더 나아가서 국제법과 평화적인 분쟁해소 원칙들에 의거해서, 우리는 그리스-터어키 관계를 개선할 것이고, FYROM(전 유고 메케도니아 공화국의 줄임말 * FYROM 인접 그리스인들은 메케도니아라는 명칭을 전 유고 메케도니아 공화국에서 사용하는 것을 반대하고 있음) 의 공식 명칭을 둘러싼 그리스와 메케도니아 간의 갈등을 해결하고, 그리스의 배타적 경제 권역을 구체화할 것이다.
- 현재 집권세력의 경제적 사회적 체제는 실패했고, 우리는 그것을 전복시켜야 한다.


 

(그리스가 당면한 문제는 국가채무 위기, 유로존 탈퇴 뿐만 아니라, 군사-지정학적 갈등 및 사회통합 문제 역시 중요한 현안이다. 마케도니아와의 갈등, 사이프러스 섬 내부 갈등해소 및 통일, NATO 탈퇴 및 평화 정착등 )
 

글로벌 자본주의 체제를 뒤흔들어놓고 경제적 위기는 환상들을 산산조각냈다. 이제 점점더 많은 사람들이 자본주의적 투기는 현대 사회에서 비인간적인 조직 원리라는 것을 깨달아가고 있다. 민간 상업은행들은 은행가들의 이익만을 추구할 뿐이고 나머지 사람들에게는 손해를 끼친다는 것도 널리 알려지고 있다. 거대 기업과 은행가들은 그리스인들의 보건의료, 교육, 연금을 희생양으로 삼고 수십억 유로 달러를 챙기고 있다.

현재 그리스 위기를 타개하기 위해서는 단호한 조치가 필요하다. 이제 이러한 위기를 불러일으킨 장본인들이 다시 위기를 가속화시키지 못하도록 만들어야 한다. 이를 위해 우리는 (그리스) 부의 생산과 분배 방식을 새롭게 수립하고 승인받아서 특정인들이 아니라 전 그리스인들을 포함시키는 신 사회-경제 모델을 수립하고자 한다. 

거대한 자본주의적 소유/재산은 이제 공공자산으로 되어야 하고, 생태적이고 사회적 원리들에 따라 민주적으로 운용되어야 한다. 우리의 전략적 목표는 민주주의 원리를 지키는 사회주의이다. (민주주의와 함께하는 사회주의이다) 이 말의 의미는 (그리스 정치에서) 의사 결정 과정에 모든 그리스 사람들이 참여한다는 뜻이다.

우리는 미래를 바꾸고 있는 과정에 있다. 우리는 그들을(*구 지배세력들) 과거로 밀어버리고 있다.우리가 승리하기 위해서는 좌파들의 통일을 이뤄내고 새로운 좌파연맹을 창출해야 한다. 이러한 시도에서 우리의 힘의 원천은 일하는 사람들의 투쟁, 창조적 노력과 격려를 포함한 민중연합 (인민연맹: 시민동맹)이다. 이것들은 우리가 자치 행정의 미래와 그 삶을 만들어 나가는데 필수적이다.

이제 의결권 (투표권)은 사람들의 손에 달려있다. 이제 그리스인들이 권력을 가지고 있는 것이다. [인민 권력]

6월 17일 총선에서 그리스 민중들은 트로이카의 체제(긴축 체제)에 반대해야 하고 반대할 수 있다. 이제는 미래를 위한 희망과 낙관주의의 새로운 페이지를 열어 젖혀야 한다.

그리스와 유럽을 위해서, 이제 해법은 '좌파와 더불어'이다 !

원시

http://www.newjinbo.org/xe/4372117





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