Challenging Authoritarian Rule: Turkish Elections 2023
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS • April 28, 2023 • Sebnem Oguz and Panagiotis Sotiris
The Turkish general election is to be held on May 14th, this includes elections to the Parliament as well as election of the President of Turkey in a two round system. The AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) has governed in Turkey for some 21 years drifting from the conservative to an authoritarian party of the far right taking on an increasingly militaristic and fascistic characteristics under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan from 2017 on. The AKP now governs in a so-called People’s Alliance with the far-right Nationalist Action Party (MHP), and now joined by smaller Islamist parties.
The election occurs in the midst of a multi-faceted crisis in Turkish politics from the economic fallout of the pandemic crisis, military engagements in the Kurdish regions of the Turkish state and surrounding regions, and the devastating loss of some 58,000 lives in the recent earthquakes. The emergence of a new fascism in Turkey is being intensively debated on the political left. In this context, an alliance of the left has formed under the banner of the Green Left Party (Yeşil Sol Parti – YSP), with support from other parties in the Labour and Freedom Alliance, with the hopes of a significant breakthrough for the political organization of the oppressed and the left in the election. This is a crucial moment in Turkish politics, the left and the surrounding states in the region.
Sebnem Oguz is formerly Professor of Political Science at Baskent University in Ankara, and a member of the editorial board of Socialist Register. She is here interviewed by Panagiotis Sotiris who teaches at the Open Hellenic University and works as a journalist in Athens, and is on the editorial board of Historical Materialism.
Panagiotis Sotiris (PS): What can you say about the situation in Turkey and the social and political dynamics on the eve of the election?
Sebnem Oguz (SO): First of all, we are dealing with the devastating consequences of the deep transformation of the political regime toward what I would call a new type of Islamic fascism and the extreme impoverishment of broad sections of society under twenty-one years of AKP (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, Justice and Development Party) rule. On top of all this came the loss of over 58,000 lives in the recent earthquake, which, as many critics have rightfully argued, is a political disaster rather than a natural one. That’s why the majority of people in Turkey are fed up with the AKP regime and want a real change in the upcoming elections.
However, this will not be as easy as it has been the case with countries like the US and Brazil. Donald Trump and Jair Bolsonaro had to accept defeat after a short period of opposing the election results because they did not stay in power for an adequate period of time to organize and take root in all state institutions. However, Recep Erdoğan’s government has remained in power for more than twenty years, creating its own bourgeoisie, forming its paramilitary forces, and redesigning the army, judiciary, media, and other state institutions. He has successfully managed the transition from the previous power bloc based on Western-oriented big capitalists that grew in the early years of the Kemalist regime to a new power bloc of emerging Islamic capitalists oriented toward countries like Qatar, Russia, and Azerbaijan.
This transition was accompanied by a deep change in the state apparatuses whereby the Diyanet (Directorate of Religious Affairs) became a prominent institution with a huge budget and extensive personnel, making political interventions in all areas of social life. In the meantime, the Turkish state has turned into a war machine that spent nearly 20% of its budget on military activities, becoming a warring state that reproduced the conflict in Eastern Turkey with the Kurdish population and conducted numerous cross-border invasions of Syria in the last four years.
All this transformation gained new dimensions after AKP’s formation of the “People’s Alliance” with the ultra-nationalist MHP (Nationalist Action Party) and BBP (Great Unity Party) in 2018. This alliance not only deepened the fascist Islamic character of the regime but also enhanced formal and informal coalitions with ultranationalist gangs, mafia leaders, and paramilitary forces. On the eve of 2023 elections, two more Islamic parties have joined the alliance: HUDAPAR (Free Cause Party) and YRP (New Welfare Party).
HUDAPAR is a Kurdish Islamist party which has its roots in the armed Hezbollah group (not related to the Lebanese Shi’a organization by the same name), that is responsible for the murder of hundreds of people including Kurdish dissidents, rights defenders, and journalists in the 1990s. It is called “Hezbo-contras” because of the role it played in state forces’ operations involving extrajudicial killings and forced disappearances. HUDAPAR has Sharia-minded elements in its program such as the criminalization of extra-marital relationships, expansion of single-sex education, and revision of women’s working conditions to “befit their nature.”
Similarly, the YRP, which shares the same Islamic roots as the AKP, is against LGBT rights and aims to end a law that protects women and children against domestic violence. Therefore, this new alliance has been rightfully described as a “new type Taliban alliance” by Selahattin Demirtaş, the imprisoned former co-leader of the HDP. It is indeed the most reactionary bloc in Turkish political history, backed by various religious cults that flourished under AKP rule. If this bloc gets elected, the transformation of the political regime toward Islamic fascism will be completed. So, the upcoming election is not only about choosing parliamentary deputies and the president but also, in fact, choosing the political regime.
PS: Are the tragic consequences of the earthquakes and the way they brought forward all the contradictions of the AKP era going to be a decisive factor in the elections?
SO: This is a difficult question. According to polls, there is a certain decline in AKP’s votes, but this decline is not so much related to the mismanagement of the earthquake. There are several reasons for this. First, Turkish society has already been polarized into two camps – “two nations” – for years, and the AKP is interested in consolidating its own support basis rather than increasing its votes from the other camp. So, after the earthquake, the AKP sent more aid to Turkish and Sunni populated areas than Kurdish and Alevi populated areas. Thus, while the government’s response to the earthquake galvanized anger among opposition voters, it did not affect core AKP voters to the same degree.
Second, throughout the relief efforts, the propaganda machine of the AKP government worked quite effectively in cooperation with Turkish Intelligence Agency and the Diyanet to save the image of Erdoğan and the regime. Displays of religious slogans were used to elicit angry responses from the secularist bloc, which, in turn, helped Erdoğan consolidate his Islamic base.
Pro-AKP news channels presented Jihadist organizations and Islamic cults as NGOs fighting against the earthquake, as those who pulled people out of the wreckage alive, saying “Allahuekber” (while, in fact, the rescuers were other volunteers). Also, anti-migrant politician Ümit Özdağ, leader of the far-right Zafer (Victory) Party, was mobilized with the goal of channeling public anger toward Syrian and other migrant groups who were accused of looting in areas affected by the earthquake. Finally, Erdoğan promised that cities would be rebuilt in a year through a reconstruction drive. This promise not only convinced his voters that only Erdoğan could restore their lives to pre-quake normality but also secured the support of pro-AKP capitalists, as the reconstruction plans would serve further wealth transfers to them.
PS: To what extent are the economic situation, inflation, and unemployment going to play a role?
SO: I think they are going to play a very significant role, maybe more than the earthquake. However, the AKP government has been trying to take measures to prevent this. Some of these measures involve populist economic support mechanisms. For instance, the age requirement for retirement was lifted for those who started employment before 1999, which means 2,250,000 citizens will have the right to retire. Increase in the minimum wage, public employee salaries, and pensions; amnesty of interest on student loans; an inexpensive housing scheme for first-time home buyers; and cheaper credit for businesses are other mechanisms of this kind. However, these measures are not enough to mitigate the effects of the economic crisis.
So, the AKP government is increasingly resorting to two major ideological mechanisms. First is the narrative of the “Century of Turkey” (the major slogan of Erdoğan’s election campaign), which emphasizes glorious “domestic and national” technological achievements such as the country’s “first domestically produced electric car” TOGG (which, in fact, largely depends on foreign companies for some of its essential parts); Turkey’s first amphibious assault ship, TCG Anadolu, “as the world’s first armed unmanned aircraft carrier,” etc. AKP leaders argue that these developments are more important than the declining purchasing power of masses.
A recent example is quite telling in this regard. In response to opposition leader Kılıçdaroğlu’s complaints about the tremendous increase in the price of onions, some AKP and MHP leaders arrogantly said, “While we are concerned with our nation’s glorious projects like TOGG, unmanned combat aerial vehicles, new natural gas in the Black Sea, etc., the opposition is concerned with trivial issues like the price of onions.” I believe this strategy cannot be effective in containing the anger of masses.
However, there is another ideological mechanism that I think might be effective on religious people: the Diyanet fetwas which legitimize poverty and inflation with statements such as “Poor people are closest to God,” “God will test believers with fear and hunger, with a decline in their lives and belongings, but God will award the patient ones at the end,” “It is only Allah who sets prices, gives hardship and abundance, and provides for,” etc. These fetwas serve to consolidate AKP voters while, at the same time, produce more anger at the secular opposition forces.
The response of people living in the countryside and those living in big cities might also differ. AKP votes in the countryside might not decline that much, as people living there are more conservative and open to Diyanet fetwas. But there might be more decline in AKP votes in three big cities, Ankara, İzmir and Istanbul. This is because the AKP used to say that social assistance will drop if the CHP wins local elections. To the contrary, municipal aid in these cities has increased since the CHP won elections in 2019, so people feel that they are not dependent on the AKP for survival.
PS: Do you think that a rejection of Erdoğan’s authoritarian style of governance is going to be evident in the election?
SO: If elections were held in a free and secure environment, Erdoğan’s authoritarianism would definitely be a major factor in his defeat. Polls show that the votes for Kılıçdaroğlu and Erdoğan are still close, but Kılıçdaroğlu’s votes are a bit higher. So, under normal conditions, we would expect Kılıçdaroğlu to win the presidential elections (maybe in the second round because Muharrem Ince will split the votes) and the opposition parties to win the majority of seats in the Parliament. However, there are important barriers against this. First among them is concern about election security. We know that only 450,000 of the over 2 million voters who left the earthquake-zone are registered. But 1,626,000 thousand voters did not register, as the deadline set by YSK (Supreme Election Council) was too close. So, they have to go back to their cities in the earth-quake zone in order to vote on election day. This is risky, as it is quite difficult to reach those cities after the quake.
There are also concerns that names of people who were lost in the earthquake can be used as voters for the AKP. The YSK’s ruling against marking voters’ fingers with indelible ink during the voting process increases this risk. Furthermore, ballot boxes will be established in 15 new countries, like Afghanistan, Libya, Nigeria, and Pakistan, where maintaining election security might be quite difficult. And most importantly, the Supreme Election Council and its provincial organizations are not impartial. Just to give an example, recently the President of Diyarbakır 9th High Criminal Court, which gave heavy sentences to Kurdish politicians, was made the Chairman of the Provincial Election Board there.
The second barrier is the use of violence against opposition parties. Recently, buildings of the CHP (Republican People’s Party), İYİP (Good Party), and YSP (Green Left Party – successor of HDP) were attacked or vandalized in Ankara, İzmir, and Istanbul. These incidents might increase and create an atmosphere of fear. There are also concerns that paramilitary forces close to the HUDAPAR might terrorize the voting stations in Kurdish provinces, districts, and villages and may even be recruited for Trump-like, Bolsonaro-like opposition in the event of AKP’s loss.
And finally, Erdoğan may play the usual nationalist card. It seems that the cross-border operation to be carried out in Rojava might not take place due to both the lack of international support and the great destruction in the earthquake. So, Erdoğan might choose to further criminalize the HDP inside the borders (although it will enter the elections under the Green Left Party due to the risk of the border being closed). The recent statement by the Turkish prosecution asking for 36 defendants, including former co-chairs of the HDP, to be punished by life imprisonment in the extremely politicized Kobani trial might serve this purpose. Erdoğan might use it in his election campaign to criminalize the Green Left Party as a successor of HDP.
PS: What aspects of social and political conflict are going to be reflected in the election?
SO: Twenty-one years of AKP rule has culminated in serious social and political conflicts induced by a deep transformation of state institutions, foreign policy, and economic management, which are all related to the AKP’s shift away from a Western-oriented power bloc to an Islamic-oriented one. Internationally, this shift also corresponds to a shift in the neoliberal model from one with rule-based institutions to another in which resource distribution is tied to “political loyalty” and informal networks of power.
The three major alliances which will compete in the elections, that is, the ruling People’s Alliance (led by AKP, having vote rates of 35-45 percent); the main opposition Nation’s Alliance (led by CHP, having vote rates of 35-45 percent); and the Labour and Freedom Alliance (led by the Green Left Party, with vote rates of 10-12 percent) have different approaches to these models. The ruling People’s Alliance wants to consolidate the politicized neoliberal model based on informal networks of power, whereas the Nation’s Alliance led by the CHP wants to restore the neoliberal model with rule-based institutions. The Labour and Freedom Alliance rejects both models and offers a third alternative which combines anti-capitalist economic policies with a radical democracy project aiming to solve the Kurdish issue through peaceful methods.
The common goal of all oppositional alliances is the overthrow of the 21-year-old AKP regime. At this point, understanding the amendment made in the electoral system a year ago is very important. According to the previous election law, seats were distributed to alliances in proportion to their respective voting rates and then distributed within the alliances. With the amendment, the seats will be distributed directly to the parties; hence, the parties in the same alliance will compete against each other. Thus, if alliances run in the election with multiple lists, the number of deputies they can win is significantly reduced. On the contrary, if they compete with a single merged list, the number of deputies would increase considerably.
The AKP made this amendment because if this system had been implemented in the 2018 election, the AKP-MHP alliance would have gotten more seats, while the CHP-İYİP alliance would have gotten fewer seats. Accordingly, on the eve of 2023 elections, the AKP wanted to merge candidate lists with the MHP. However, the MHP refused to do so after the new additions to the alliance. This means the People’s Alliance might end up with 15 to 20 seats less than it could have won. So, we can say that the AKP’s initial plan backfired. The Nation’s Alliance, on the other hand, managed to turn the system to its own advantage by creating “alliances within alliances” in electoral districts throughout the country. Accordingly, İYİP will have its own lists and candidates of the four smaller parties in the Nation’s Alliance that will compete as candidates of the CHP, to switch back to their parties once elected.
However, the same cannot be said for Labour and Freedom Alliance composed of Green Left Party and Turkish Workers Party (TİP). The Green Left Party has its own joint list which combines candidates from HDP and its five socialist component parties with Kurdish political parties such as Kurdish Communist Party and three other Turkish socialist parties. But it couldn’t convince the TİP to join this common list. The TİP will field candidates separately in 41 provinces. This will mean candidates of both parties will compete with each other in some provinces, which might lead to a loss of seats for the Labour and Freedom Alliance as a whole.
PS: The decision of the HDP not to present a presidential candidate, will it help the opposition’s chances, and how is it related to the party’s stated goals of increased democratization?
SO: The HDP’s decision not to present a presidential candidate practically means supporting Kılıçdaroğlu in the presidential elections. This will definitely help the opposition’s chances, as the HDP’s 10-12 percent voting rate will be crucial for Kılıçdaroğlu to win a majority against Erdoğan. I believe that Kılıçdaroğlu’s possible presidency will also help the HDP’s goals of democratization. It is important to remember that Kılıçdaroğlu said, “The address for the solution of Kurdish problem is the Parliament” in his recent meeting with the HDP co-chairs.
Of course, Kılıçdaroğlu might not be able to go too far in these attempts because of his nationalist ally, the IYIP. He might not be able to break up with the national security paradigm either. Still, his discourse on security has its differences from Erdoğan’s. Kılıçdaroğlu is much more interested in border security against incoming refugees and Jihadist groups rather than cross-border operations in northern Syria. More importantly, he might take important steps toward democratization through re-establishing the rule of law, independence of the judiciary, autonomy of universities, etc. It is the duty of HDP and its allies to force Kılıçdaroğlu to take further steps in this direction.
PS: Do you think there is any chance of different dynamics being expressed in the presidential and parliamentary elections?
SO: An important dynamic to be considered in the elections is how the ruling and oppositional blocs will respond to the huge wealth transfer to pro-AKP capitalists, bureaucrats, and Islamic cults over the 21 years of AKP rule. Kılıçdaroğlu has pledged to get back $418-billion of state funds transferred from the Treasury to the “Gang of 5,” the five biggest conglomerates that grew through AKP’s support in recent years. In response, the Gang of 5 is alleged to have had informal meetings to defeat Kılıçdaroğlu in the elections, while simultaneously negotiating with members of IYIP for a smooth transition in case the Nation’s Alliance wins.
Similarly, the AKP is doing all it can to win the elections in order to maintain these wealth-transfer mechanisms and prevent lawsuits against them. At the same time, however, they are also preparing themselves for the possibility of losing power. An important step they have taken in this regard is nominating many former AKP ministers as parliamentary candidates so that they can be given immunity. Similarly, the list of MHP’s deputy candidates includes the suspects of five political murders that will never be forgotten in Turkish political history.
To conclude, I can say that we will not have normal elections, not only in terms of the electoral process itself but also in terms of the possible composition of the new parliament. We might see counter-guerrilla leaders and political murderers, representatives of different national and international power blocs, deputies expected to serve as “diplomats” between these blocs, former AKP ministers with immunity for their previous crimes in the new parliament. On the other hand, we hope to have numerous deputies from the Labour and Freedom Alliance who will struggle for a totally different world. There are only 30 days left, but everything is still very unpredictable. Let’s hope that the elections will pave the way for a transition from dictatorship to democracy rather than the consolidation of dictatorship. •
This article first published in Greek on the IN.gr website.
Sebnem Oguz is a retired profesor of political science and a member of Ankara Solidarity Academy. She received her PhD degree in Political Science from York University, Canada.
Panagiotis Sotiris is a journalist based in Athens, Greece and a member of the editorial board of Historical Materialism.
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"Democratic Party of the Peoples" redirects here. For other uses, see People's Democratic Party (disambiguation) and Democratic People's Party (disambiguation).
Peoples' Democratic Party
Halkların Demokratik Partisi
Logo of the Peoples' Democratic Party (Turkey).svg
Abbreviation HDP[1]
Chairwoman Pervin Buldan
Chairman Mithat Sancar
Spokesperson Ebru Günay[2]
Founded 15 October 2012; 10 years ago[3]
Preceded by Peace and Democracy Party
Headquarters Büklüm Sokağı 117
06680 Çankaya, Ankara[4]
Membership (2023) Increase 45,302[5]
Ideology
Minority rights[6]
Kurdish interests[7]
Kurdish nationalism[8][9]
(Left-wing nationalism)
Democratic socialism[10]
Secularism[11]
Progressivism[12]
Social democracy[11]
Left-wing populism[13]
Regionalism[17]
Feminism[20]
Political position Centre-left[21] to left-wing[22]
National affiliation Peoples' Democratic Congress
Labour and Freedom Alliance (Since 2022)
European affiliation Party of European Socialists (associate)[23]
International affiliation Progressive Alliance[24]
Socialist International (consultative)[25]
Colours Purple Green
Slogan Bu daha başlangıç
("This is Just the Beginning")[26] "Biz'ler meclise"[27]
Grand National Assembly
56 / 600
Metropolitan municipalities
0 / 30
District municipalities
6 / 1,351
Provincial councillors
101 / 1,251
Municipal Assemblies
1,230 / 20,498
Party flag
Flag of the Peoples' Democratic Party
Website
hdp.org.tr/en/
Politics of TurkeyPolitical partiesElections
The Peoples' Democratic Party (Turkish: Halkların Demokratik Partisi, acronymized as HDP; Kurdish: Partiya Demokratîk a Gelan[28]), or Democratic Party of the Peoples, is a pro-minority political party in Turkey. Generally left-wing, the party places a strong emphasis on participatory and radical democracy, feminism, LGBT rights, minority rights, youth rights and egalitarianism. It is an associate member of the Party of European Socialists (PES),[29] a consultative member of the Socialist International[30] and a party within the Progressive Alliance (PA).[31]
Aspiring to fundamentally challenge the existing Turkish–Kurdish divide and other existing parameters in Turkish politics, the HDP was founded in 2012 as the political wing of the Peoples' Democratic Congress, a union of numerous left-wing movements that had previously fielded candidates as independents to bypass the 10% election threshold. The HDP is in an alliance with the Kurdish Democratic Regions Party (DBP), often described as the HDP's fraternal party. From 2013 to 2015, the politicians of the DBP participated in peace negotiations between the Turkish government and the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK).
The party operates a co-presidential system of leadership, with one chairman and one chairwoman.[32] In the 2014 presidential election, the party put forward its chairman, Selahattin Demirtaş, who won 9.77% of the vote. Despite concerns that it could fall short of the 10% election threshold, the party put forward party-lists instead of running independent candidates in the subsequent June 2015 general election. Exceeding expectations, it polled at 13.12%, becoming the third largest parliamentary group. The party briefly participated in the interim election government formed by AKP Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu on 28 August 2015, with HDP MPs Ali Haydar Konca and Müslüm Doğan becoming the Minister of European Union Affairs and the Minister of Development respectively. The party governs the municipalities in which they have won the elections in a Co-Mayorship constituted by a woman and a man[33]
Witnessing the 2016 Turkish coup attempt and pointing out previous repression of democratic forces by martial powers, the HDP strongly opposed the coup. The HDP was first ignored and left out of the post-coup national truce while the Turkish purges targeted alleged members of the Gülen movement. From September 2016, the Turkish judiciary started to submit HDP elected officials to anti-terrorism accusations. Several HDP parliamentarians have been imprisoned in November 2016[34][35] including the party co-chairs Selahattin Demirtaş, and Figen Yüksekdağ,[35] widely disturbing the HDP's ability to communicate and be active on the political scene. In December 2020 HDP co-deputy head for local governments, Salim Kaplan said that "since 2016, 20,000 of our members have been taken into custody and more than 10,000 of our members and executives have been sent to jail." and 48 municipalities have been seized by the government.[36] The ruling AKP accuses the HDP of having direct links with the PKK[37] and was in March 2021, defending itself against prohibition, until the case was dropped.[38]
Overview
The HDP first participated in the 2014 local elections, where it ran in most provinces in western Turkey while the DBP ran in the Kurdish south-east. The two parties combined gained 6.2% of the total votes but HDP failed to win any municipalities. The 21 MPs from the Peace and Democracy Party, the predecessor of the DBP, joined the HDP on 28 August 2014.[39] For the June 2015 general election, the HDP took the decision to field candidates as a party despite the danger of potentially falling below the 10% threshold. Even though most of the politicians from HDP are secular left-wing Kurds, the candidate list included devout Muslims, socialists, Alevis, Armenians, Assyrians, Azerbaijanis, Circassians, Lazi, Romanis and LGBT activists. Of the 550 candidates, 268 were women.[40][41][42] In 2015, Barış Sulu was the first openly gay parliamentary candidate in Turkey as a candidate of the HDP.[43] Support for the HDP among Alevis rose from 7% to 16% between June 2015 and June 2018.[44]
Foundation
People's Democratic Congress
Main article: Peoples' Democratic Congress
The People's Democratic Party originates from the Peoples' Democratic Congress (Halkların Demokratik Kongresi, HDK), a platform composed of various groups including left wing parties Revolutionary Socialist Workers' Party (DSIP), Labour Party (EMEP), Socialist Party of the Oppressed (ESP), Socialist Democracy Party (SDP), Socialist Party of Refoundation, the Greens and the Left Party of the Future, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP), some far-left factions, feminist groups, LGBT groups, trade unions and ethnic initiatives representing Alevis, Armenians, and Pomaks.[45] In the 2011 general election, the HDK fielded 61 independent candidates in order to bypass the 10% parliamentary threshold under the 'Labour, Democracy and Freedom Block'. 36 members were elected, though the election of Hatip Dicle was later annulled by the Supreme Electoral Council and this number subsequently fell to 35.
Fatma Gök, one of the HDP's founding chairpersons, described the HDK as a means of providing political hope to citizens and also as a way of intervening in the Turkish political system. The HDK operated by organising conferences and congresses, establishing the HDP as a means of fulfilling their political goals and establishing a means of having political influence.
Founding principles
The formal application of the HDK for political party status was delivered to the Ministry of the Interior on 15 October 2012. One of the party's chairpersons, Yavuz Önen, claimed that the party would be the political wing of the HDK and not a replacement for it.[46][47]
The HDP was described by its founding chairpersons as a party that aims to eliminate the exploitation of labour and to fundamentally re-establish a democracy in which honourable and humanitarian individuals can live together as equal citizens.[48] It was further described as a party aiming to bring about fundamental change to the existing Capitalist system though uniting a wide range of left-wing opposition movements. Gök claimed that any political movement with similar aims to the HDK that had not merged with the party was more than welcome to do so. However, Önen claimed that the HDP would be entering elections as an individual party and not as part of a wider electoral alliance, adding that the party is itself formed of a wide coalition of political forces in the first place.[49]
Concerns were raised that the inclusion of the Kurdish nationalist HDK member Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in the HDP would raise allegations that the HDP was also a mainly Kurdish orientated party. However, Önen claimed that the HDP's key goal was to establish a different perspective of viewing the Turkish political scene and moving away from the existing 'Kurdish versus Turkish' dichotomy that had become institutionally entrenched within Turkish political perceptions.[50] Three outstanding parliamentarians of the BDP, Sebahat Tuncel, Sırrı Süreyya Önder, and Ertuğrul Kürkçü abdicated in October 2013 to join the HDP. Levent Tüzel, former Labour Party chairman and independent member of parliament also joined the three to form a caucus.[51] In April 2014, 24 more parliamentarians from the BDP joined the HDP, which following formed a parliamentary group.[52]
Split with the Labour Party
Labour Party founder Abdullah Levent Tüzel joined the HDP parliamentary caucus despite party's split with the HDP
The Labour Party (EMEP) had been a member of the Peoples' Democratic Congress and had participated in the establishment of the HDP in 2012. However, the EMEP released a statement on 17 June 2014, announcing a split with the HDP.[53] The split was attributed to the restructuring of the Kurdish nationalist Peace and Democracy Party into a local-only party under the new name Democratic Regions Party (DBP), while the BDP's parliamentary caucus would be integrated into the HDP. This would, in turn, require the HDP's constitution to be altered in order to ensure greater compliance and conformity with the ideology of the BDP. This caused the EMEP to formally announce their secession from the HDP, but stated that they would continue their participation with the HDK. Despite the split, the Labour Party endorsed the HDP presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtaş for the 2014 presidential election and also announced that they would not be running in the June 2015 general election.[54][55]
Ideology
The HDP is seen as the Turkish variant of the Greek SYRIZA and the Spanish Podemos parties, similar in their anti-capitalist stance. The founding co-chairs of the HDP, Yavuz Önen and Fatma Gök, both emphasized the HDP's fundamental principle of rejecting capitalism and "labour exploitation" for the benefit of all Turkish citizens regardless of race, gender or religion.[citation needed] The party in this sense is therefore secular, though has refrained from endorsing the secularism enshrined in the principles of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.[citation needed] The HDP has also called for a new constitution that enshrines minority rights for Kurds, Alevis and other minorities.[56]
Kurdish peoples living in Turkey have long been a persecuted minority, or forcibly assimilated.[57] This has led them to support leftist and parties which defended Kurdish cultural rights. This began with the People's Labor Party (HEP) and continued with the Freedom and Equality Party (ÖZEP) in June 1992, the Freedom and Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) in October 1992, the Democracy Party (DEP) in 1993, the People's Democracy Party (HADEP) in 1994, the Democratic People's Party (DEHAP) in 1997, the Democratic Society Party (DTP) in 2005, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) in 2008 and finally the Democratic Regions Party (DBP) in 2014. Most of these parties were closed down for allegedly violating the constitution.[58] While the HDP is also affiliated with the Peace and Democracy Party and the Democratic Regions Party, it aims to establish a new perspective that overcomes the traditional Turkish versus Kurdish divide. The HDP instead aims to collectively represent people of all ethnic or religious backgrounds and to safeguard their civil liberties by bringing about direct democracy and an end to capitalist exploitation. The party has long advocated the establishment of local 'people's parliaments' to increase democratic representation and decentralisation of power. Much of the party's attempts to unite citizens throughout Turkey is through the opposition to the governing conservative Justice and Development Party (AKP), which the HDP has accused of being authoritarian, exploitative and discriminatory against religious minorities.[59] The HDP's foreign policy also involves opening the border to Armenia[56] which has been closed since 1993 due to Turkey support of Azerbaijan during the first Nagorno-Karabakh War.[60] The HDP is the only major political party in Turkey that does not support Armenian genocide denial[61] and urges Turkey to set up a truth commission and take responsibility regarding their role in World War I.[62] The parties women branch criticized that the decision to withdraw from the Istanbul Convention which protects the rights of women, was taken by a single man.[63]
During a conference in Selahattin Demirtaş's presidential election campaign, the HDP had caused controversy by not displaying any Turkish flags. In response, Demirtaş had maintained that the HDP respected the flag, stating that the flag represented all citizens of Turkey.[64] The party addresses a wide spectrum of voters, having had candidates of different gender and social, national and religious background. A high proportion of women, as well as Alevi, Armenian, Yazidi, and Assyrian candidates mixed with Turkish left-wing politician candidates played a major role towards the success in the parliamentary elections of June 2015.[62]
December 2016 attacks
On December 17, 2016, at around 21:30 (UTC+3) four masked people attacked the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP) office in the Beylikdüzü district of Istanbul, which is located at a shopping mall. The attackers managed to overcome the security personnel and started a fire which caused the explosions of the two gas tubes inside the building. One police officer and a security guard sustained minor injuries. That same night, shots were fired by unidentified assailants at the HDP headquarters in Darıca, Kocaeli Province.[65][66][67] Attacks on other HDP offices across the country were also reported, including İzmir, Çanakkale, Hatay, Ankara, and Erzincan.[68]
Relations with the Kurdistan Workers' Party
The HDP maintained talks with Abdullah Öcalan through which Öcalan gave a message to the congress stating that "We have never considered our movement apart from Turkey's revolutionary and socialist movements. We have always regarded ourselves as an integral part of this outcome" and "we have to consider the HDP as an integral part of the historical democratic dialogue and negotiation process. If socialism and an open democracy succeed in Turkey, it will be closely related to this democratic negotiation process."[69] Öcalan's niece Dilek Öcalan was[70] and nephew Ömer Öcalan is a member of parliament.[71] The relationship between the HDP and the PKK has been put forward by the governing Justice and Development Party (AKP) as a reason why it would be better for the HDP to not gain representation in Parliament, though government journalists alleged that this would result in greater violence by the PKK and attempts to establish a separate parliament in Diyarbakır.[72][73] In contrast, HDP politicians also accused the AKP of scaremongering when they claimed that their affiliation to the PKK made them unfit for parliamentary representation.[72][74] PKK militants have also been accused of raiding local shops and cafes in the south-east of Turkey and demanding votes for the HDP, with one civilian being wounded when a group of PKK youth militants raided a cafe in Silvan.[75][76] Selahattin Demirtaş has denied having an 'organic relationship' with the PKK and claimed that the allegations of PKK militants demanding votes for the HDP from voters was untrue.[77][78]
Legal prosecutions
Further information: List of arrested mayors in Turkey and 2021 Peoples' Democratic Party closure case
According to the pro-government daily Daily Sabah, the HDP members have long been accused of voicing their support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party and glorifying terrorism committed by the organization. Selahattin Demirtas, whose older brother is a member of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, has been accused by pro-Turkish government newspaper Daily Sabah of supporting the PKK's leader Abdullah Öcalan in a 2016 speech in Nowruz.[79][better source needed] Members of the party have been also accused of providing financial support to the PKK and attending the funeral of killed rebels.[80][better source needed] On 15 June 2016, the HDP was criticized after its members attended the funeral of Eylem Yaşa, a suicide bomber who had killed police officers and civilians, and injured 51 others in Istanbul.[81][better source needed] In July 2018, a prosecutor initiated an investigation into the attendance of Feleknas Uca and Mehmet Rüştü Tiryaki to a funeral ceremony of a member of the People's Defence Forces (HPG), the armed wing of the PKK in their electoral district Batman.[82][83] In November 2016 the party Co-Chairs MPs Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ as well as the HDP MPs Nursel Aydogan, Idris Baluken, Leyla Birlik, Ferhat Encü, Selma Irmak, Abdullah Zeydan, Nihat Akdoğan and Gülser Yildirim have been arrested.[84][34]
From September 2016 and forward the Turkish judiciary started submitting HDP supporters, staff and elected officials to anti-terrorism accusations.[85] On the 20 May 2016 the Turkish Parliament voted in favor to enabling the lifting of MPs immunity, following which 54 of the 59 HDP MPs were prosecuted on terrorism-related charges.[86] As of June 2017, more than 10 HDP representatives were under arrest, widely disturbing the HDP's ability to communicate and remain active in the political scene. On June 5, the Turkish interior ministry announced that 130 people who are outside the country while being suspected of militant links will lose their citizenship unless they return to Turkey within three months and meet government standards. Three of the suspects are HDP leaders: Faysal Sarıyıldız, Tuğba Hezer Öztürk, and Özdal Üçer [tr].[87] In March 2018 it was reported that 11'000 HDP members have been detained, of which more than 3000 have been arrested.[88] Also in the days the local elections of March 2019 dozens of candidates for municipal councils were arrested over terror charges.[89] The Council of Europe reported, that after the elections were held, six elected mayors as well as dozens of elected members of the municipal council were not allowed to assume their posts for having been dismissed during the state of emergency[90] following the attempted coup d'état in 2016. The HDP appealed to the court that they should be allowed to assume, but the constitutional court denied the request.[90] The HDP reported that after the municipal elections in 2014, more than 90 elected mayors of the HDP ally Democratic Regions Party (DBP) have been dismissed and dozens of them have been arrested as well.[91] In 2016, the Interior Ministry filed a criminal complaint about four HDP members, including former deputy Mülkiye Birtane, for making terror propaganda.[92]
On 1 March 2018, the HDP's deputy Dilek Öcalan, the niece of Abdullah Öcalan, the founding leader of the PKK, was sentenced to two years and six months in prison for making terror propaganda. Two months later, the membership of two deputies, Osman Baydemir and Selma Irmak, were revoked after they were convicted and sentenced on criminal charges related to the PKK.[93][94] In the same month, the former deputy Aysel Tuğluk was sentenced to ten years in prison for being a member of a terror organization (PKK).[95]
In August 2018, a former deputy Leyla Birlik fled to Greece where she reportedly sought asylum. According to the Turkish sources, she had been arrested in November 2016 for making terror propaganda and released pending trial, but she had left the country despite her travelling ban.[96]
On 11 August 2018, one of the deputies of the party, Mahmud Togrul, was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in prison for making terror propaganda.[97] Two months later, the former lawmaker Sırrı Süreyya Önder was sentenced to 3 years and 6 months in jail for spreading terror propaganda.[98]
In September 2020, the Turkish Government ordered the detention of the current Mayor of Kars Ayhan Bilgen, together with other prominent HDP figures like the former MPs Ayla Akat Ata or Sırri Süreyya Önder due to their support of the Kobani protests in 2014 which were held in support of the Kurdish population besieged in Kobani by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).[99] By October 2020, Duvar reported that only six out of the sixty-five elected mayors of the HDP were still acting as mayors. The other mayors were replaced by state imposed trustees of the Turkish Ministry of the Interior.[100] In June 2020, Leyla Güven and Musa Farisogullari were stripped of their parliamentarian immunity and arrested.[101] Two of their MPs had to defend themselves from having attended a Democracy March in protest of the dismissal of Farisoğullari and Güven in the midst of the spark of the COVID-19 pandemic.[102] Since February 2021, several parliamentarians are faced with investigations into the lifting of their parliamentarian immunity due to the parties involvement in the protests during the Siege of Kobani in October 2014.[103] Ömer Faruk Gergerlioğlu was stripped of his parliamentary membership on 17 March 2021[104] due a conviction for spreading "terror propaganda" in a tweet of 2016 supporting eventual peace negotiations with the PKK.[105] On the same day the state prosecutor of the Supreme Court of Appeals Bekir Şahin filed a lawsuit demanding the closure of the HDP at the Constitutional Court of Turkey due to the parties alleged organizational links with the PKK. He also called for a five-year ban from politics for 687 HDP politicians.[106] Amongst the politicians who are to be banned from politics figure all former party leaders including Selahattin Demirtaş and Figen Yüksekdağ and dozens of former and current members of parliament.[106]
Kurdish peace process
Main article: Solution process
The Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) government began a peace process with the PKK in 2013, consisting of a withdrawal of militants from Turkish soil and negotiations towards the normalisation following nearly 30 years of armed conflict between Kurdish rebels and the Turkish Armed Forces. As a strong advocate of minority rights, the HDP was involved in negotiations with both the government and also the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan on İmralı Island.
Relations with the Justice and Development Party
Despite being a left-wing party, the HDP has been accused of negotiating with the conservative orientated right-wing Justice and Development Party (AKP) behind closed doors on issues mainly surrounding the Solution process to the Kurdish separatist militants. Critics of the government and the HDP alleged that such talks could lead to a potential coalition between the AKP and HDP in the event that the HDP enters parliament and the AKP does not win a majority. Such a coalition could potentially deliver Kurdish nationalist demands to the south-east of Turkey while the HDP support the AKP's long-time policy of introducing a presidential system in place of the existing parliamentary system.[107] In March, AKP Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç claimed that the HDP would be their partners in the solution process and expressed his wish to work in harmony, though also accused some HDP MPs of not working towards lasting peace with sincerity.[108] In contrast, government minister Bekir Bozdağ accused the HDP of being part of an 'international project' intending to destabilise the government of Turkey.[109] Relations seemed to sour in early April, where the HDP accused the AKP of staging a pre-planned attack against PKK members in the province of Ağrı aimed at gathering more votes in the upcoming general election. In response, Deputy Prime Minister Yalçın Akdoğan accused Selahattin Demirtaş of acting like a PKK spokesman. In February 2015, HDP chairwoman Figen Yüksekdağ claimed that a joint statement regarding the solution process could be made with the AKP.[110] Delegations from the AKP and the HDP formally met in the Prime Minister's office in Dolmabahçe Palace in April 2015.[111] After a raid on the HDP office in Esenyurt, Istanbul in January 2021, Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu shared a video flashing images of Abdullah Öcalan, criticizing the European Court of Human Rights for their verdicts.[112] The HDP responded that the same images are already used by the HDP themselves since over six months in their press releases.[112] The Presidential spokesperson Fahrettin Altun equated the HDP with the PKK.[112]
2014 Siege of Kobanî protests
Main articles: 2014 Kurdish riots in Turkey and Siege of Kobanî
The peace process was nearly disbanded after pro-Kurdish protests and riots broke out in south-eastern Turkey protesting the lack of government intervention against the advance of ISIL militants on the city of Kobanî in Syria, just south of the Turkish border. The HDP openly supported the protests, while calling for non-violence.[113][114] Protestors were met with tear gas and water cannon, leading to more than 40 deaths.[115] Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoğlu heavily criticised the HDP for calling for more protests and responded by drafting a heavily controversial domestic security bill and calling for the HDP to prove itself to be a peaceful political party.[116] Nevertheless, the solution process continued despite the riots, with ISIL being completely ejected from Kobanî by April 2015.[117] HDP MP Altan Tan later claimed that his party had miscalculated the consequences of calling for more protests, although his statements were met with opposition from the confederalist KCK organisation.[118]
Historical leaders
The HDP operates a co-presidential system, whereby the party is chaired by one chairman and one chairwoman, elected during party congresses. Since its establishment in 2012, the party has had a total of ten leaders, five men and five women. The current leaders were elected at the 4th Congress of the Peoples' Democratic Party on the 23 February 2020.[119]
Chairpersons
The following is a list of the current and previous chairpersons of the HDP, showing the names, birth and death dates where applicable and also the start and end dates of their leadership.
No. Chairman
(Born–Died)
Portrait Chairwoman
(Born–Died)
Portrait Term in Office
1 Yavuz Önen
(1938–)
No image.svg Fatma Gök
(1948–)
No image.svg 15 October 2012 27 October 2013
2 Ertuğrul Kürkçü (1948–) Ertuğrul Kürkçü (cropped).jpg Sebahat Tuncel (1975–) Sebahat Tuncel.jpg 27 October 2013 22 June 2014
3 Selahattin Demirtaş (1973–) Selahattin Demirtaş.png Figen Yüksekdağ (1971–) Figen Yüksekdağ.jpg 22 June 2014 9 March 2017
4 Serpil Kemalbay(1964–) Serpil Kemalbay.jpg 9 March 2017 11 February 2018
5 Sezai Temelli (1963–) Sezai Temelli 3rd ordinary congress.jpg Pervin Buldan (1967–) Pervin Buldan, 3 July 2022 (cropped).jpg 11 February 2018 23 February 2020
6 Mithat Sancar (1963–) 23 February 2020 Incumbent
Honorary Presidents
In the Extraordinary HDP congress held on 22 June 2014, the outgoing chairperson Ertuğrul Kürkçü was by an amendment in the HDP Bylaw [120] awarded the status of the Honorary President. Kürkçü is the first co-president to serve in that capacity.
No. President (male)
(Born–Died) Portrait Term in Office
1 Ertuğrul Kürkçü
(1948–) Ertuğrul Kürkçü (cropped).jpg 22 June 2014 Incumbent
Party congresses
The party has held several ordinary congresses throughout different cities, mostly focussing on provinces in south-eastern Turkey. So far, the party has had two nationwide extraordinary congresses, held in 2013 and 2014, where elections were held to select the chairpersons of the party.
1st Extraordinary congress, 2013
The party's 1st extraordinary congress was held in the Ahmet Taner Kışlalı Stadium in Ankara on 27 October 2013. The HDP Executive Board and the Congressional Preparation Council both recommended Ertuğrul Kürkçü and Sebahat Tuncel for the positions of chairman and chairwoman respectively, after which both formally assumed their positions. The congress focussed mainly in voicing support for the Gezi Park protests. A message from the imprisoned PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, emphasizing the party's support for a decentralization of power and for the establishment of localized 'people's parliaments', was also read out. 105 sitting and 25 reserve members were elected to the Party Council.[121]
2nd Extraordinary congress, 2014
The party's 2nd extraordinary congress was again held in the Ahmet Taner Kışlalı Stadium on 22 June 2014. 156 delegates were eligible to cast votes to elect the new chairman and chairwoman. Since a majority could not be secured in the first two rounds of voting, the leadership election proceeded into a third round where Selahattin Demirtaş was elected as the chairman and Figen Yüksekdağ was elected as the chairwoman of the party. Speeches by the elected leaders mainly centred on the corruption within the Turkish government and also opposition to the established political system.[122] 100 sitting and 50 reserve members for the Party Council were elected. Outgoing chairpersons Ertuğrul Kürkçü and Sebahat Tuncel were declared Honorary Presidents of the party.[123]
3rd Extraordinary Congress, 2017
In the HDPs 3rd Extraordinary Congress on 20 May 2017, Serpil Kemalbay was elected as the new chairwoman while Selahattin Demirtaş was confirmed as its chairman.[124] The party's previous female party leader, Figen Yüksekdağ, had been imprisoned in November 2016, and the Turkish Parliament revoked her parliamentary membership on the 21 February 2017 and on the 9 March 2017 the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled she was no longer a member of the HDP.[125]
Electoral performance
Formed in 2012, the HDP has since contested two local, two presidential and three general election. A summary of the results and number of candidates elected is shown below.
Local elections
Local elections
Election date Party leaders Popular Vote Percentage Municipalities Councillors
Metropolitan District Municipal Provincial
2014 Ertuğrul Kürkçü
Sebahat Tuncel 2,611,127 6.29%
2 / 30
97 / 1,351
1,441 / 20,458
129 / 1,251
2019 Sezai Temelli
Pervin Buldan
2,409,485 5.60%
3 / 30
57 / 1,351
1,230 / 20,745
101 / 1,272
2024 Mithat Sancar
Pervin Buldan
2014 local elections
Results obtained by the BDP and HDP by Province in the 2014 local elections
Main article: 2014 Turkish local elections
At the 2014 municipal elections, HDP ran parallel to BDP, with the BDP running in Turkey's Kurdish-dominated southeast while the HDP competed in the rest of the country[126] except Mersin Province and Konya Province where BDP launched its own candidates.[127]
After the local elections, the two parties were re-organised in a joint structure. On 28 April 2014, the entire parliamentary caucus of BDP joined HDP, whereas BDP (itself re-organised as the Democratic Regions Party by July) was assigned exclusively to representatives on the local administration level.[128][129]
Presidential elections
Presidential elections
Election date Candidate Votes Percentage Position
2014 Selahattin Demirtaş 3,958,048 9.77 3rd
2018 Selahattin Demirtaş 4,205,219 8.40 3rd
2014 presidential election
Main article: 2014 Turkish presidential election
Selahattin Demirtaş's election campaign logo
Votes obtained by Demirtaş throughout the 81 Provinces of Turkey
Selahattin Demirtaş was announced as the HDP's candidate for the Presidency on 30 June. In a campaign dominated by the Solution process with Kurdish rebels, he claimed on 5 August in Van that the government of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had not done enough to bring forward promised legislation, and that the process would collapse immediately if the AKP did not do more to bring lasting peace in the southeast.[130]
On 15 July, Demirtaş outlined his road-map for his presidency should he win the election. In a speech lasting just under an hour, he proposed that the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet) should be disbanded, that compulsory religion lessons in schools should be removed and that Cemevis (the Alevi houses of worship) should receive national recognition.[131] He also proposed the introduction of "People's Parliaments" (Cumhur meclisleri), which would also incorporate Youth Parliaments to increase representation of young citizens.[132] Pushing for a new constitution, Demirtaş outlined the need to end the non-representation of different cultures, languages, races and beliefs without delay to ensure national stability.[133] Also in his speech, he praised the Gezi Park protests and displayed photos of himself during the events. He continued to direct applause to the mother of the murdered teenager Berkin Elvan, who died 269 days after being hit by a tear gas canister during the protests and falling into a coma.[134] On the issue of the lack of Turkish flags within the hall in which he was delivering his speech, Demirtaş stated that the Turkish flag represented all citizens of Turkey.[135] His slogan is "Bir Cumhurbaşkanı Düşün" (Imagine a President...), which is followed by several different phrases, such as "Bir Cumhurbaşkanı Düşünün Ayrımcılık yapmıyor. Birleştiriyor, barıştırıyor." (Imagine a President who doesn't Discriminate, who Unites and makes Peace) or "Bir Cumhurbaşkanı Düşünün Herkese Demokrat" (Imagine a President who is Democratic to Everybody).[131] Most of the votes that were cast for Demirtaş were from the Kurdish south-east.
Votes obtained by the HDP presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtaş by province
General elections
General election results of the Peoples' Democratic Party (HDP)
Election Leader Vote Result Seats Position Map
7 June 2015
Selahattin Demirtaş
Figen Yüksekdağ Turkish general election, June 2015 pie chart.png
6,058,489 13.12%
Increase 13.12 pp Parliament of Turkey June 2015.svg
80 / 550 (Increase 80) #4th
Interim election government Turkish general election HDP votes by province.png
1 November 2015
Selahattin Demirtaş
Figen Yüksekdağ Turkish general election, November 2015 pie chart.png
5,148,085 10.76%
Decrease 2.37 pp Parliament of Turkey November 2015.svg
59 / 550 (Decrease 21) #3rd
Opposition Turkish general election, November 2015 (HDP).png
24 June 2018
Sezai Temelli
Pervin Buldan 2018SeçimPastaGrafik.png
5,867,302 11.70%
Increase 0.94 pp Parliament of Turkey 2018.svg
67 / 600 (Increase 19) #3rd
Opposition HDP2018.png
June 2015 general election
Main article: June 2015 Turkish general election
A HDP election stand in Germany, 3 May 2015
Emboldened by the 9.77% of the vote won by HDP co-leader Selahattin Demirtaş in the 2014 presidential election the HDP contested the election by fielding party candidates rather than independent candidates. This was controversial since the HDP's votes would be lost in the event that the HDP failed to win above 10% of the vote. There was speculation as to whether the AKP forced Öcalan to pressure the HDP to contest the election as a party in order to boost their own number of MPs.[136] The party charged a ₺2,000 application fee for prospective male candidates, a ₺1,000 fee for female and young candidates under the age of 27 and no fee was collected from disabled applicants. Applications for candidacy were received between 16 February and 2 March.[137]
According to a private poll conducted by the HDP in January 2015, the party needed to gather around 600,000 more supporters by the general election in order to surpass the election threshold of 10% and win 72 MPs.[138][139] Polling organisations such as Metropoll, however, predicted that the party would win around 55 MPs if they won more than 10%.[140] HDP candidates hoped that the victory of the left-wing SYRIZA in the January 2015 Greek legislative election in January would result in a boost in popularity.[141]
In order to maximise their votes, the party's co-leader Figen Yüksekdağ announced that the HDP would begin negotiations with the United June Movement, a socialist intellectual and political platform that includes left-wing parties such as the Freedom and Solidarity Party (ÖDP) and the Labour Party (EMEP). Negotiations between parties began taking place in early 2015, with the intention of forming a broad alliance rather than a strict political coalition. Although Yüksekdağ ruled out negotiating with the CHP since they were 'closed to dialogue' and Demirtaş was opposed to negotiations, CHP deputy leader Sezgin Tanrıkulu said that the CHP was open for talks and that the two parties had until 7 April to come to an agreement.[142]
HDP rallied more than expected and gained 13.12% of the total votes cast (6,280,302 out of 46,774,793), breaking the 10% threshold, the minimum set for any Turkish political party to have its representatives sit in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (TBMM), and securing 81 seats. The HDP carried victories in 14 out of 85 electoral districts in Turkey: Ardahan, Kars, Iğdır, Ağrı Province, Muş, Bitlis, Van, Turkey, Hakkâri, Şırnak, Siirt, Batman, Mardin, Diyarbakır and Tunceli. These electoral districts are mostly Kurdish-majority provinces. In this election, however, the HDP departed from its traditional Kurdish issues-focused role and embraced other minority ethnic and religious groups in Turkey, women's issues, LGBT and left-wing activists and political groups under its wing, promoting its appeal to a national level and drawing a wider pool of support from all over Turkey. This resulted the HDP to be not only the 4th largest political party in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey but also a formidable force in gaining the Turkish overseas votes, ranking 2nd after the AKP with 20.41% and carrying Japan, Ukraine, Greece, Poland, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Canada and the U.K. The HDP also derailed the AKP from being the majority party, forming a single-party government and reaching 330 seats in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the necessary number to enact a referendum necessary to change the constitution so that Turkey would abandon its traditional parliamentary government and instead adopt an American-style executive presidency government. This is hailed by Turkey's opposition parties and their supporters as the biggest contribution the HDP made to the Republic of Turkey.
2023 presidential election
Main article: 2023 Turkish presidential election
On 22 March 2023, the HDP declared that they will not field a presidential candidate for the 2023 Turkish presidential election, instead focusing on campaigning against Erdoğan's rule, boosting the chances of the Republican People's Party (CHP) candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.[143]