1. 이란의 요구 사항 (호르무즈 해협 통제권, 농축 우라늄 권한, 미국의 1차,2차 경제제재 해제, UN 제재 해제, 레바논과 가자에서 이스라엘의 군사작전 중지까지 포함하는 '포괄적 정전', 걸프 지역에서 미군의 철수.
2. 이란은 왜 이스라엘의 레바논(헤즈볼라)과의 휴전을 중요하게 생각하는가?
1) 팔레스타인 '가자'와 레바논 '헤즈볼라'에 대한 이란의 태도는, 단지 말뿐인 수사가 아니다. 2024년에 이란이 이 두 곳과의 동맹을 등한시 했다는 비판을 받음. 이란은 '가자'와 '헤즈볼라(레바논)'과의 동맹을 강화하지 않으면, 이 곳에서 '저항의 축'이 깨진다는 것을 잘 알고 있다.
2) 레바논(헤즈볼라), 팔레스타인(하마스), 이라크(민병대)와 예멘(후티) 에 있는 이란의 동맹세력은 이란의 안보와 직결된다. 따라서 이란은 이스라엘과 헤즈볼라의 휴전을 요구할 것이다.
3) 미국이 이스라엘의 전쟁 의지를 제어할 수 있느냐는, 미국이 실제 이란과의 휴전 협상할 의지가 있는가를 알 수 있는 시험대이다.
만약 미국이 이스라엘의 레바논 (헤즈볼라) 폭격을 중단시키지 못한다면, 이란과 미국의 휴전 협정의 가치가 떨어진다고 본다.
3. 이란이 호르무즈 해협 장악, 통행료 부과할 것인가?
장기적으로는 이란은 아시아와 유럽을 통상 파트너로 확보하려고 하기 때문에, 향후 호르무즈 해협을 군사적으로 봉쇄하거나 통행료를 부과하지 않을 것이다.
4. 이란과 미국의 휴전 협상의 내용은 무엇인가?
이란과 미국이 각각 '부분적 승리'를 했다고 '승리 서사' 발표, 전면전 재발은 아니지만, '깨지기 쉬운 균형'이다.
이란은 이스라엘과 미국의 연합 공격을 막아냈다. 걸프 지역의 통제권을 유지했다고 승리 선언.
트럼은 '또다른 항구적인 전쟁'을 피하고, 원유 가격 폭등을 막아냈고, 이란의 군사능력을 약화시키는데 성공 등 승리 선언이 가능하다.
이란과 미국은 다시 '전면전'을 원치 않는다. 그러나 여전히 '깨지기 쉬운 균형' 상태이다.
트라티 파르시.
Trita Parsi (퀸시 연구소 ) "Losing an Enemy - Obama, Iran and the Triump of Diplomacy" 저자.
US-Israel war on Iran
Is the US-Iran ceasefire already doomed?
Even if the talks fail to produce a deal, a return to an all-out war may still be averted.
By Trita Parsi
Published On 10 Apr 2026
Pakistani Rangers patrol near the president's house.
Pakistani Rangers patrol near the president's house, as Pakistan prepares to host the US and Iran for peace talks, in Islamabad, Pakistan, April 10, 2026 [Asim Hafeez/Reuters]
Expectations for the upcoming talks between the United States and Iran in Pakistan are understandably modest. There is even a risk that the meeting won’t take place at all.
Yet, paradoxically, the failure of the talks may still shift the situation in a positive direction. Indeed, the true measure of the ceasefire’s success may not be whether it yields a lasting accord with Iran. It may lie instead in what it forestalls: Even in the absence of a durable deal, Washington may have found a way to avoid going back into a futile war.
이란의 입장, 모호한 이유.
Tehran’s reaction to the talks has been ambivalent.
The government has cast the ceasefire as a victory, projecting strength at home and abroad. But many voices close to the security establishment are less sanguine (*optimistic) , warning that Iran may have sacrificed momentum and weakened its deterrent posture by settling for anything short of a complete and immediate end to hostilities.
Still, whatever the internal debate, there is little dispute about one point: The ceasefire, as it stands, reflects Iran’s terms more than America’s.
Let us consider what the ceasefire entails. The negotiations will proceed on the basis of Tehran’s 10-point proposal, not US President Donald Trump’s 15-point plan for Iranian capitulation.
As part of this, Iran will retain control of the Strait of Hormuz during the truce – continuing to collect transit fees from passing vessels.
이란의 요구 사항 (호르무즈 해협 통제권, 농축 우라늄 권한, 미국의 1차,2차 경제제재 해제, UN 제재 해제, 레바논과 가자에서 이스라엘의 군사작전 중지까지 포함하는 '포괄적 정전', 걸프 지역에서 미군의 철수.
Washington appears to have conceded two critical points: That it tacitly acknowledges Iran’s authority over the strait, and that Tehran holds the upper hand in setting the terms of the talks. Trump himself seemed to signal as much, describing the Iranian proposal on social media as a “workable” foundation.
Unsurprisingly, this has raised eyebrows in Washington, given the scope of Iran’s demands.
They range from recognition of Iran’s continued control over the strait and acceptance of uranium enrichment, to the lifting of all US primary and secondary sanctions – as well as United Nations sanctions – to a withdrawal of US combat forces from the region, and a comprehensive ceasefire that would extend to Israel’s operations in Lebanon and Gaza.
It is difficult to imagine Washington agreeing to such terms in full. Just as uncertain is how far Iran is willing to bend – whether it would pare back its demands or hold firm on a maximalist position.
The geopolitical consequences would be profound if the final outcome reflects these demands. Yet it is equally important to recognise that Tehran is unlikely to wield control of the Strait of Hormuz as a blunt instrument of coercion.
Rather, it is more likely to use that leverage to rebuild economic ties with Asian and European partners – countries that once traded extensively with Iran but were pushed out of its market over the past 15 years by US sanctions. Even so, this would be a bitter pill for Iran’s regional rivals.
Trump, however, has already hinted he may be prepared to accept such an arrangement, noting that the US itself is not dependent on the oil that flows through the strait. The burden, in other words, would fall far more heavily on Asia and Europe.
Tehran’s insistence that the ceasefire extend to Israel may prove the most difficult obstacle, given that the latter is not party to the talks and has long resisted being bound by agreements it did not help shape.
For Iran, this demand is rooted in three considerations.
1) 팔레스타인 '가자'와 레바논 '헤즈볼라'에 대한 이란의 태도는, 단지 말뿐인 수사가 아니다. 2024년에 이란이 이 두 곳과의 동맹을 등한시 했다는 비판을 받음. 이란은 '가자'와 '헤즈볼라(레바논)'과의 동맹을 강화하지 않으면, 이 곳에서 '저항의 축'이 깨진다는 것을 잘 알고 있다.
2) 레바논(헤즈볼라), 팔레스타인(하마스), 이라크(민병대)와 예멘(후티) 에 있는 이란의 동맹세력은 이란의 안보와 직결된다. 따라서 이란은 이스라엘과 헤즈볼라의 휴전을 요구할 것이다.
3) 미국이 이스라엘의 전쟁 의지를 제어할 수 있느냐는, 미국이 실제 이란과의 휴전 협상할 의지가 있는가를 알 수 있는 시험대이다.
만약 미국이 이스라엘의 레바논 (헤즈볼라) 폭격을 중단시키지 못한다면, 이란과 미국의 휴전 협정의 가치가 떨어진다고 본다.
First, solidarity with the peoples of Gaza and Lebanon is not merely rhetorical; it is central to Tehran’s regional posture. Having been widely perceived as abandoning these constituencies in 2024, Iran can ill afford another rupture that would further weaken the so-called “axis of resistance”.
Second, continued Israeli bombardment risks reigniting confrontation between Israel and Iran – a cycle that has already flared twice since October 7, 2023. The linkage between these arenas is not only real but widely acknowledged, including in Western rhetoric that casts Iran as the hub of resistance to Israeli and US policies, expressed through its network of allied groups in Lebanon, Palestine, Iraq and Yemen. From Tehran’s vantage point, a durable halt to its own conflict with Israel cannot be separated from ending Israel’s wars in Gaza and Lebanon. As such, it is not an aspirational add-on but a necessary condition.
Perhaps more consequentially, tying Israel to the ceasefire is a test of Washington’s willingness – and ability – to restrain its closest regional ally. If Trump cannot, or would not, do so, the value of any ceasefire with Washington comes into question. An agreement that leaves Israel free to reignite hostilities – and the US unable to keep itself from being drawn back in – offers little assurance of stability. Under such conditions, the utility of a ceasefire with the Trump administration diminishes sharply.
Whatever the outcome of the talks in Islamabad, the strategic landscape has already been altered. Trump’s failed war has weakened the credibility of US military threats. Washington can still brandish force, but after a costly and futile conflict, such warnings no longer carry the same weight.
트럼프는 전쟁에서 얻은 게 없다. 트럼프의 이란 침략은 실패한 전쟁이다.
미국과 이란 휴전 협상에서, '인내 외교' '통제된 외교'가 필요하다. 트럼프는 이런 덕목들을 전혀 갖추지 못했지만.
다른 강대국들 (특히 중국)의 참여가 필요하다. 그래야 전쟁 재발을 막을 수 있다.
A new reality now shapes US-Iran diplomacy: Washington can no longer dictate terms. Any agreement would require genuine compromise – patient, disciplined diplomacy that tolerates ambiguity, qualities rarely associated with Trump.
It may also necessitate the involvement of other major powers, particularly China, to help stabilise the process and reduce the risk of a relapse into conflict.
All of this argues for tempered expectations. Yet even if the talks collapse – and even if Israel resumes attacks on Iran – it does not automatically follow that the US would be drawn back into war. There is little reason to believe a second round would end differently, or that it would not again leave Iran positioned to disrupt the global economy. No wonder Tehran feels confident that its deterrence has been restored.
The more plausible outcome is a new, non-negotiated status quo – one not codified through formal agreement but sustained by mutual constraint.
The US would stay out of the war; Iran would continue to exert control over traffic through the Strait of Hormuz; Israel and Iran would continue a low-level conflict. A full-scale US-Iran war would be, for the moment, averted.
Such an equilibrium would reflect not enough political will to reach a comprehensive settlement, but sufficient shared interest to avoid a wider conflagration – and a degree of tolerance for an arrangement in which both sides could claim partial victory.
Iran could plausibly claim it weathered the combined might of Israel and the US while emerging with its geopolitical position intact – if not strengthened. Trump, for his part, could argue that he avoided another forever war, steadied energy markets, and secured tactical gains by degrading Iran’s military capabilities.
이란과 미국이 각각 '부분적 승리'를 했다고 선언.
이란은 이스라엘과 미국의 연합 공격을 막아냈다. 걸프 지역의 통제권을 유지했다고 승리 선언.
트럼은 '또다른 항구적인 전쟁'을 피하고, 원유 가격 폭등을 막아냈고, 이란의 군사능력을 약화시키는데 성공 등 승리 선언이 가능하다.
So long as both sides cling to a narrative of victory, a fragile equilibrium – absent full-scale war – may yet endure.
The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance.
Trita Parsi (퀸시 연구소 ) "Losing an Enemy - Obama, Iran and the Triump of Diplomacy" 저자.
Trita Parsi is the Executive Vice President and co-founder of the Quincy Institute and author of Losing an Enemy - Obama, Iran and the Triumph of Diplomacy
출처.
https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2026/4/10/is-trumps-iran-ceasefire-already-doomed
Is the US-Iran ceasefire already doomed?
Even if the talks fail to produce a deal, a return to an all-out war may still be averted.
www.aljazeera.com
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